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ABSTRACT
ENGINEERING IN THE MAKING:
AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
by Armineh Noravian
While there are many known factors that contribute to the success or failure of
small innovation companies (SIC), the product development processes (PDPs) for these
companies are generally poorly understood. The goal of this thesis is to understand PDPs
and their consequences in such a company. Fieldwork is performed onsite using
ethnographic methods, and the unit of study is the project, consisting of prior projects,
projects in progress, and new projects.
The results show that PDPs are interpretive and not just sets of rules followed by
individuals. Although there are patterns that emerge in how things are done, individual
characteristics and the social processes by which they interact shape the construction of
the actual PDPs. This has consequences on the way Engineering is organized and
managed, and on engineering education.
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CHAPTER 1: PROBLEM
"Innovation drives the economic success of Silicon Valley. The ability to
generate new ideas, products and processes is an important source of regional
competitive advantage" (Joint Ventures 2006:14). An array of small innovation
companies characterizes the region and provides the innovative edge that makes Silicon
Valley a major gateway to the global economy. "More than twenty five percent of all
venture capital in the United States is invested in Silicon Valley.. .About 23,800 net new
firms (with an average size of seven employees) were created during the 2000-2002
period. In fact, Silicon Valley is constantly renewing its company base: 46% of all the
region's firms were started in the five years spanning 1998 to 2002, representing 30% of
all the region's jobs" (Joint Ventures 2006:9). However, many of these businesses
struggle or fail.
"At the heart of [a] company's competitiveness is its product development
process" (Raja 2001:25). While there are many known factors that contribute to the
success or failure of innovation companies, the product development processes (PDPs)
for small innovative companies are generally poorly understood. A review of some of
the literature reveals a variety of different models (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995;
Blanchard and Fabrycky 1998; Otto and Wood 2001; Roozenburg and Eekels 1995;
Karvi and Belikoff 1996; Hoedemaker et al 1999; Kusiak and Park 1990; Anthony and
McKay 1992; Cunha and Gomes 2003; Fairlie-Clarke and Muller 2003; Calantone and
Benedetto 1988). Some models include activities such as business analysis, marketing,
technical engineering design, development of manufacturing plans, and validation.
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Sometimes distribution channels for strategically marketing and introducing the new
product are also included (Otto and Wood 2001:5). Generally, research of technology
used in product development and manufacturing is not included in PDPs (Otto and Wood
2001:6). Although the literature on PDPs is vast, it tends to be generalized, prescriptive,
and theoretical, but it does not apply to small innovative companies that adopt
idiosyncratic PDPs.
Furthermore, PDP is in the lexicon of those involved in product development at
various levels, but it is invoked in context dependent ways and means different things to
different people. For instance, the following excerpts from interviews conducted at Small
Innovation Company (SIC) reflect the variety of definitions. The sources have been
deliberately not identified to protect their anonymity.
Example 1: "You can't train people on how to do stuff when things change all the
time.. .Things should be more routine than they have been. It seems that everything we
do is an exception to the rule. We shouldn't have to struggle to figure out how to do
things that can be routinized." For this individual, process is a set of rules that allow
efficiency on things that are routine. Following these rules simplify things.
Example 2: "This is a mature company. Product development process is not clearly
defined. It is in the heads of people. There is an informal methodology in place. We are
120 people. What if we became [a] $100 million company? How would we be today?
We would then need to teach and educate people what our process is. Structurally we are

informal. The philosophy at the top is that we want to remain entrepreneurial, fast,
helping customers, and meeting customer expectations. This principle is doing things
fast, there is a lot of ramifications. Fast means we are not perfect." He added, "We are
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struggling with execution. Why? Because we lack effective decision-making. We don't
have a behavioral framework that all employees understand.. .Another reason is clarity
around accountability. Why would a senior executive not have the authority to make
decisions? So we flounder and all decisions get pushed out. People are not empowered to
make decisions." For this individual, process would allow effective decision-making and
accountability.
Example 3: "One of our problems is communication. We never have company meetings.
So the leadership doesn't communicate. Different departments are in different silos. The
top leadership job is to link us all with a common message. There is no message. We
don't talk to each other." For this individual process is communications between
different functional groups.
Example 4: "[the owner of SIC] just comes in here and tells people to stop working on
what they are working on and do something else." "One thing that's been driving people
crazy is [the CEO] getting involved in Engineering.. .1 think that's wrong.. .is
disrespectful, is sticking his nose in Engineering to solve day-to-day problems." When
asked why he thought the CEO did this, he responded, "What [the CEO] does is create
noise from information. It's not productive." He added, "[the CEO] is business minded.
[The owner] enjoys the process of developing products and delivering a service. He
doesn't think about business. It's more emotional for him." For this individual, process
means organizational clarity and conformity to rules.
Example 5: An individual was discussing a recently discovered problem on an established
product. In answering what could have been done to catch this problem earlier, he said,
"[This kind of problem] and other field problems we can always minimize with a process.

4

It is partially the process ... You don't need to have geniuses working here, but with a
better process, you could do better. You can't just depend on having the best in the
business, but a better process would help." So, for this individual process eliminates
individual judgment and fallibility. When asked what that would be, he said, "By and
large, engineers have a decent handle on some kind of process. Engineers seem to
understand that there is a need for one, less chaotic product development process. I make
an effort to get it. Didn't get that far." This process would come from engineers, as
opposed to management.
Example 6: An individual was trying to explain what went wrong on his project, "Things
can go wrong by not following proper engineering processes." He explained process as
follows: "Something like ISO allows you to have everyone bobbing up and down in step,
even if it's not the best step, at least it's the same step. In larger companies, technicians
do technician work, electronics engineers do electronics, mechanical engineers do
mechanical engineering, and so on. In a small environment, you do what ever is required
to get the job done. [So] it adds chaos. It's something that runs on its own. Now you
have many heads bobbing up and out of sync doing their own gig. In a two-man
operation, it's essential. Even here, it can be [essential] as long as the interface between
departments are [SIC] properly structured." For this individual process means clarity of
functions and planning.
Example 7: "You know they are struggling for money... but they also waste a lot of
money. Rush jobs, premier pays, etc. Existing products cost a lot of money because they
are not reliable or manufacturable. This is costly." Another said, "They are [doing well]
but could do better and could make more money. For a little company, they spend a lot
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of money on projects that should never get started." Process for these individuals means
planning.
Example 8:
"There is not typical process." Yet another said, "Product development
process is what we don't have here. I would say [the owner] has an idea and we
just do what he wants. What we don't have is that we don't brainstorm how
things need to be done. He tells us how to implement. We then implement things
in a toy like manner." He also added,
"I like the HP way.. .You need to go through a feasibility study before
'green-lighting' a project. 'Green-lighting' requires the feedback from
every group in the company. This was the worst company for that. [The
owner] gives approval, but does not look at feedback. The net effects are
low quality product, a rush to market, and a hit to morale. We need to
have a process that is scalable to grow the company. One guy making
decisions doesn't allow this. I believe that building a company is related
to processes. At SIC, there is more than one example of [the owner] has
an idea that he believes has some market potential. We are thrown in a
dramatically different direction in Engineering. I worked on [a project],
which was really hot and the most important thing in the company, but
within two months it disappeared. We built a prototype, it went to a trade
show, came back from trade show, didn't work too well there because we
didn't have time to do it right. It then sat on the shelf and it was forgotten
about, in lieu of other opportunities."
It appears that this individual believes that the current process is doing whatever
[the owner], the founder-owner at SIC, says. He, however, would prefer a process that
could be used as a tool for negotiating, participating, and contributing. It could also be
seen as a way to make sense out of what is going on.
Example 9: When asked about PDP, this individual said, "controlled chaos. There is a
vision from [the owner of SIC], and his interactions between products, customers and
others, also from his history and knowledge. He is the technical expert of the company.
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He gets insights about products. The problem is that [the owner] has all these ideas in the
pipeline and instead of doing 70%, we try to implement 90% of them.. .Chaos is the
innovation and creativity." When asked one thing about this process that he would like to
change, he replies, "more project planning." So for this individual, the PDP is everything
and anything.
Example 10: "It takes a lot of time to get a product out the door. We don't have a clear
repeatable process for that." This individual was referring to product development as
something that can be used to develop products in a mechanical fashion.
Therefore, PDPs seemingly have different meanings and functions for different
individuals. But a common theme seems to be that it brings clarity to what is going on,
within the context that matters to each individual. According to Spradley (1979:5),
people interpret experience and generate social behavior based on their acquired
knowledge. However, this map is flexible and does not compel people to follow a
particular course (Spradley 1979:7). A PDP is thus used in an interpretive endeavor and
not just a set of rules that individuals follow. Through different assumptions, meanings,
and contexts individuals construct the nature and function of a PDP. This would mean
that individual characteristics and histories, and the social process by which these
individuals interact are important components in the construction of a PDP. This study
will focus on understanding PDPs from this interpretive perspective.
Cunha and Gomes (2003:174) argue, "that organizations are developing new
approaches to the product innovation process as they realize that traditional approaches
may no longer be appropriate, given the characteristics of today's competitive game."
Otto and Wood (2001:12) tell us "Every company has a different development process
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out of necessity; there is no single "best" development process; the design process and
the product development process are misnomers. The sophistication of the product, the
competitive environment, the rate of change of technology, the rate of change of the
system within which the product is used: These and many other factors that shape a
product development process change for different companies." The goal of this thesis is
to understand how people do product development in a small innovation company and
the consequences that follow from their distinctive way of doing things. The knowledge
gained from this study provides insight into (1) the conditions that exist in small
innovative organizations, which influence PDPs in such organizations and (2) the skills
needed to navigate the product development of innovative products in such organizations.
The anthropological-ethnographic literature relevant to PDPs is relatively small.
Kunda's (1992) ethnography of the engineering division in a large high-technology
corporation describes, interprets, and evaluates the experience of the members of the
organization as they are being influenced by the management's imposition of
organizational ideology in an attempt to control the hearts and minds of the workers.
Downey and Dumit's (1997) collection of case studies explores how science, technology,
and medicine penetrate everyday lives and change the boundaries of how people think
about themselves and the world around them. Schiffer's (2001) edited volume addresses
the perspectives of archaeologists and socio-cultural anthropologists on technology.
Among the chapters, Kingery's "The Design Process as a Critical Component of the
Anthropology of Technology," where he discusses the flow chart used in engineering
texts showing engineering analysis as a sequence of problem solving activities taught to
engineering students as the design process, is especially relevant. It is, he says, a "naive
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model widely accepted by the engineering community"(2001:126). He proposes five
specific activities that characterize the problem solving design process, which he believes
provide a more comprehensive framework for past technological change and future
prospects. The activities (purpose and goals, normal configuration, operational
principles, performance characteristics, and design tools) are however, broad
generalizations. Finally, Vinck's (2003) book of ethnographic case studies describes how
things are actually done in different engineering environments. The ethnographies
examine the complexity of technical practices, the social and cultural worlds of designers
and technical action practices, and the role of writing practices and their end products.
None explore the PDP of a small innovation company, as is done in this thesis.
In summary, PDPs have different meanings and functions for different
individuals, is interpretive, and is different for different companies and even for different
products in the same company. This has consequences on the way Engineering is
organized and managed, the way it functions, the skills required by engineers who work
in such an environment, and engineering education. It is the goal of this thesis to
explicate and understand these consequences.
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY
Because PDPs have different meanings for different individuals, their
characteristics and histories, and the social processes in which they participate, are
relevant to how PDPs are constructed and used in a company. A PDP is not presented as
a single and formal structure that guides action. Instead, it is actively created by
individuals drawing upon different assumptions, meanings, and practices, as they
encounter the real challenges of moving from ideas to tangible products. A survey will
not adequately provide an insight into these various factors; therefore, an ethnographic
method of data collection is used.
Data collection was done onsite at SIC. During a nine-month period, thirty-two
trips were made, with an average of five and a half hours per trip spent on site. After
each trip, another five to six hours were spent transcribing field notes and for reflection
and analysis.
Data was collected from people in different positions in the organization who
influenced or participated in different ways in product development. The positions
ranged from those working on the assembly line to the founder-owner of the company.
The data collection strategy is consistent with ethnographic standards and
practices. "Ethnographers make cultural inferences from three sources: (1) from what
people say; (2) from the way people act; and (3) from the artifacts people use" (Spradley
1979:8). Data collection was thus done using several methods.
Open-ended conversation with people concerning products under development
was one source of data. This included information on the nature of the product being
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developed, as well as the roles people assumed or were assigned, their educational
backgrounds, histories, work experience, and their perception of the work that needed to
be done.
Another source of data was observation of various people at work. This included
engineers in the laboratory, the industrial designers in their area, the test group at their
equipment, or the people working in the assembly area. However, in an office
environment, where people sat at their desks and worked on their computers, this type of
observation did not provide valuable data. Data collected through open-ended
conversations and observations was documented and used to make inferences about what
people said they did, what they did, and how they did it, as related to product
development.
Project meetings were also a rich source of data. Here, interactions between
different functional groups or between members of an engineering team could be
observed. During the latter stages of this study, meeting minutes became available,
which became part of the collected data. This type of data was used to follow what was
occurring on the various projects and to obtain insight on the process of how ideas were
transformed into products on different projects.
During the entire study, all the people working on projects were under time
pressure. In situ interviews were conducted while they were working. This meant that
they talked about what they were doing and why they did it as they worked. However,
this could not be done for prolonged periods of time because it would have affected their
work. So, this type of data collection was done in frequent intervals of short duration.
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However, data collection during meetings was different in that I was ignored and could
freely collect data.
Information specific to each project, such as a timeline for its various phases, was
also collected. Although I never saw an officially-documented timeline, the oral timeline
was taken very seriously. Other information in this category included product features,
which defined what the product needed to be able to do, and reports from the test
department, which documented whether the product passed or failed certain tests. Only
the reports from the test department were documented on paper. Features of completed
products were on the website, although, features for products under development were all
oral. This type of data showed what people were working to achieve on a technical level
and the constraints they worked within.
The website provided a complete list of SIC's entire product line, their features,
and their prices. It also showed a list of industries that use SIC products. This was used
to learn about the different products that SIC produced and provided a list of projects to
study.
A Google search on SIC produced a number of hits about the company's history
and the founder-owner; most were newspaper articles about the company. Various
patents were also described on the Internet. This was used to gather public information
about the company, company history, and founder's story.
The physical layout of the company, the various artifacts that were in the lobby,
and how Engineering was organized were also documented in my field notes. This
information is provided to orient the reader to the functional layout of the company.
Appendix A gives the reader a detailed description of the layout of the company.
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Most people at SIC were extremely busy individuals. They were very open and
helpful about discussing what they did, but care was taken that collecting data did not
adversely affect their jobs.
Since product development models include activities such as business analysis,
marketing, engineering, manufacturing and field support planning (Otto and Wood 2001),
PDPs include a number of different people from different functional groups who interact
with each other for the specific purpose of developing a product, within a certain time
and a certain budget. "A project can be considered to be any series of activities and tasks
that have a specific objective to be completed within certain specifications, have defined
start and end dates, have funding limits (if applicable), consume human and non-human
resources (i.e., money, people, equipment), and be multifunctional (i.e., cut across several
functional lines)" (Kerzner 2001:2). Therefore, to study the PDP, the appropriate unit of
study is the project, as opposed to individuals or functional groups. This captures the
range of activities involved in the process of developing a product, the different ways that
functional groups and different individuals contribute to the development of a product,
and how individuals interact within and outside their own functional groups.
Furthermore, there were a number of different projects in progress and each project was
at a different stage. Studying these different projects allowed comparison and contrast
between the development processes for different products.
Different individuals work in different phases of projects; some even work
outside their own functional groups. Looking at projects as the unit of study provides
insight on the skills needed to participate in various phases of product development and
how these individual contribute to the construction of the process. Therefore, I collected
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data on PDPs on a project basis; i.e., on products that had been developed before I
arrived, products that were under development, and products that were just starting up.
My own background affected this research. Having worked as an engineer, in
both technical and managerial capacities for over twenty years, makes an engineering
environment seem like home to me. There were perhaps many things that I took for
granted or assumptions that I made, and it's possible that I might have seen things
differently had I not been one of the "natives" myself. However, this background was
also beneficial for a number of reasons. According to Spradley (1979:17) knowing the
language allows the ethnographer to communicate, to know how to categorize experience
and how the natives use these categories in customary thought. This allows the
ethnographer to ask questions that make sense to the informants. Also, "language not
only functions as a means of communications, it also functions to create and express a
cultural reality" (Spradley 1979:20). Therefore, if the ethnographer doesn't speak the
native language, the informant may feel the need to translate so that the ethnographer
would understand. When this happens, it presents a handicap to discovering their culture
(Spradley 1979:20). Product development, especially the product design portion, has
specialized language that people in other functional departments of the same organization
often cannot understand. In this case, I was able to understand this language without the
need for translation.
On language and ethnographic description Spradley (1979:22) asks, "how is it
possible to describe a culture in its own terms when using an alien language? The answer
lies in the fact that every ethnographic description is a translation. As such, it must use
both native terms and their meanings as well as those of the ethnographer." In this case,
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the native terms and those of the ethnographer are almost the same. In writing this thesis,
although I have used much of the insider's language to provide the reader this insider's
perspective, I have also tried to translate to a language that is not that of the insiders, or
the ethnographer, but that of anthropologists who would not necessarily have knowledge
of it.
I cannot claim to be a detached observer for another reason: my engineering
ethics. As an engineer, I look at product development as a process that brings an idea
into life, which hopefully benefits society in some way or at least does not hurt it. My
ethics dictates that there should never be shortcuts when it comes to product quality
because a poor quality product may be harmful to the user; imagine the nightmare of
having to evaluate what went wrong when someone used the product you designed and
got electrocuted or traveled across the bridge that collapsed. This aspect of my
engineering background is so ingrained in me that I cannot objectively participate in a
study where the technical aspect of the product is involved. I have therefore stayed away
from this and have focused on product development from the perspective of the path that
an idea travels through to become a product. The success of the product in the marketplace is something that I evaluate from the number of years that the company has been in
business and how much it has grown.
Onsite, I was only able to collect data. The opportunity to sit back and analyze
what I learned was rare because a lot was going on and the environment made it difficult

for me to obtain the necessary detachment to do so. However, away from the site, after
each fieldtrip, I was able to sit back and reflect on the data that I had collected and to
obtain the necessary detachment that I needed to analyze what was taking place, as an
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anthropologist. I spent almost as many hours offsite as onsite reflecting on what I had
learned.
Individuals at SIC who participated in this research received and signed an
'Agreement to Participate in Research' in which they were told about the purpose of this
research, that their participation was voluntary, and that information that could identify
them would not be included in the published results.
I also signed a 'Non-Disclosure Agreement' in which I agreed to keep
confidential information that was disclosed to me concerning the development and the
engineering of parts, equipment, processes and/or services.
In summary, ethnographic methods were used to gain insight on how products
were developed at SIC. I collected data by talking to and observing various people who
worked on different projects. Data was collected on product that SIC had developed and
was in the process of developing. This included (1) prior project, that is projects that had
been completed before this research began, (2) projects that were in progress, that is
projects that had began before this research and were continuing, and (3) new projects,
that is projects that began after this research. The process of product development
includes activities related to business, marketing, technical design, development of
manufacturing plans, and validation. Data collection was done in such a way as to
minimize any disturbance to the people involved.
In the final analysis, the insight gained from understanding how people do
product development at SIC can identify conditions that affect PDPs in small innovative
technology companies. Knowing these conditions, in turn, allows us to better understand
the skills needed to function in such an environment.
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CHAPTER 3: A COMPANY OVERVIEW
SIC is a small privately held innovation company in the San Francisco Bay Area
that develops products to meet its customer needs. It was started in 1983 by the current
founder-owner, Ed (pseudonym). The company employs over 100 people and markets its
products through a network of 200 dealers and distributors around the world (SIC
website, August 21, 2007). It is rumored to have an annual sales of 20 million dollars,
although this figure could not be confirmed since the company is private. The operating
funds come from sales of products and from loans.
Product
SIC designs products for a niche market, that is, a distinct segment of a market.
This means that their products are specialized and serve a specific market need. There
are very few other companies competing with SIC for market share. This creates a
challenge; mentioning SIC's product in this research is likely to lead to the identification
of SIC as a company. Therefore, to protect their anonymity, an analogy is provided with
another product: printers and ink cartridges. This should provide the reader a tangible
representation of the product so that they can understand the company's business model
and the description of the PDPs.
SIC has two categories of products: machines and consumables. Printers are
analogous to the SIC machines, and the ink cartridges are analogous to the SIC
consumables. Machines are sold in small volumes, while consumables are sold in high
volumes. The SIC business model is to sell machines to enable the sales of consumables.
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The profit margins on machines are generally small, while most of the profit comes from
selling consumables.
Put differently, customers who purchase SIC's consumables must have a machine
to either use them or to provide a service to others with these consumables. The
machines are thus the initial and substantial investment needed by SIC customers.
Some of the industries that can use their products are government, financial
service organizations, libraries, legal firms, schools, and private individuals. The current
products include nine types of machines and 16 categories of consumables. Within each
category of consumables there is a range of different options that customers can choose
from. Using the ink cartridge analogy, it would be much like different ink colors or
different types of ink for different applications, although many of SIC's products are
patented. A part of the market that the company addresses is new and evolving very fast.
The products studied during this research are listed in Table 1, in the three
categories that they will be studied: (1) prior projects, (2) projects that were in progress,
and (3) new projects.
Table 1 - Project Categories Studied

Machines

Consumables

Prior projects
Model-1
Model-2
Model-3
Model-4
Model-5
Model-Pi
Model-P2
1st consumable

Projects in progress
Model-6
Model-7
Model-S

New Projects
Model-Bz
Model-Q

Auto-consumable

Special orders
Model-Q consumable
Model-Q-M
Model-Q-N
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Functional groups
Since the machines and the consumables are two distinct product categories, SIC
requires two different sets of resources with specialized expertise to develop each product
category. On the machine side, the Engineering group is required to have expertise in
electronics, firmware, and mechanical engineering. Electronics components are used to
drive or control various mechanical parts. The firmware, which is the computer program
that is embedded in electronic components such as memory chips, is executed by the
processor chip to control various mechanical parts. The mechanical parts are both
stationary and moving parts, and make up the bulk of the machines. Industrial design
expertise is used to design the user interface and the look and feel of the product.
On the consumable side, knowledge of chemical engineering is required. The
industrial design team assists the founder-owner in the design of the various
consumables.
The manufacturing of these two categories of products is also separate. The
machines are assembled on an assembly line by assemblers, while the consumables are
manufactured using different types of machinery and different people who can operate
them. Manufacturing is the group that assembles the machines and manufactures the
consumables.
The executive team listed on the website indicates a number of different
functional groups, each headed by a vice president. The founder/president is at the helm
of the organization. The CEO reports to the founder, and a number of vice presidents
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report to the CEO. Each vice president heads his or her own functional group. See
Figure 1 for an executive level organizational chart.
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Figure 1 - Executive Level Organizational Chart

The functional group that is not mentioned in Figure 1 is the marketing group.
There is no executive heading the Marketing group within the organization. This is a
function that is primarily directed by the founder-owner, with assistance from the CEO
and the Product Marketing Manager. The market for the new products that SIC is
entering is new and rapidly evolving due to technological changes. The products evolve
as the markets evolve.
The functional layout at SIC is shown in Figure 2. All the functional groups are
located on the first floor, with the exception of the industrial design group and the
founder-owner's office, which are on the second floor. The two vice presidents that do
not occupy an executive office are the VP of Engineering and the VP of Operations.
They stay in their own functional areas. The VP of European sales is located overseas.
A detailed grand tour is provided in Appendix A.

20

Industrial
Design area

unoccupied

1st Floor

Engineering test/
Design
Verification
Test
area
2nd Floor

Executive
offices

to 2nd floor
Technical
support
area

Prototyping
area

Sales and
Marketing
area

Founderowner's
office &
lab.

lobby

^
Main
Conference
room

Lunchroom

Machine asseml ?ly area

Customer
Service area

Engineering

Manufacturing
Purchasing
offices
area
Machine shop

Consumables manufacturing area
Shipping &
Receiving

Not to scale

Figure 2 - Functional Layout at SIC
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Founder's story
An overview of the company is not complete without a discussion of the founderowner, Ed. He has been featured in a number of newspaper articles which discuss how
his interest in the machine and consumable technology got started in the basement of his
parents' home in his teenage years, and how he started SIC when he was in college.
Currently, as the founder-owner of SIC, he performs high-level managerial functions, but
is also involved in the PDPs or any other technical activity at his discretion. The
company is named after him and in the lobby at SIC the display of products shows the
evolution of the products from Ed's basement to now. This display might give the
impression that SIC is a continuation of Ed's basement or his product development
activities.
The founder's story, according to some written sources, inside and outside SIC,
began with Ed's high school teacher, who knew of his interests and his talents. When Ed
was a university student, his teacher asked him to solve a problem with a consumable that
he was selling in his side business; he was receiving complaints about poor quality from
his customers. This is analogous to a printer ink cartridge that had problems. Ed took
some time off from his studies to do this, but soon realized that to make these
consumables, he would need a machine that would cost thousands of dollars. So he set
out to build a machine in the basement of his parents' home from parts he gathered in
junkyards. To return to the analogy, this would be much like developing a machine to
produce these printer ink cartridges. Once this was done, he gave his company a name
and started selling these consumables through his high school teacher's business. Later
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on, he built the machine that customers would use with these consumables. This machine
became the Model-1, the company's first machine. In effect, this is analogous to having
produced the first printer that would work with the printer ink cartridges that he
developed.
Why SIC?
Some years ago, I spent four months as a consultant at SIC, where I managed
various active projects and helped recruit a permanent head of Engineering. I learned
that the PDPs at SIC could not be adequately understood through current literature on this
subject. I also saw that while most companies were taking their manufacturing offshore,
at SIC, most of the products were and still are conceived, developed, and manufactured in
the same facility, that is, under one roof in the San Francisco Bay Area. The company
manages to develop innovative products that are in demand and make money.
Therefore, when looking for a small innovation company where I could study its PDPs, I
decided to approach the founder-owner, Ed, and to ask him if I could do an ethnographic
study of the PDP at his company. After seeking approval from the Vice President of
Engineering, who was new at the time, I was able to begin this research.
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CHAPTER 4: PRIOR PROJECTS
This chapter includes projects that were completed before the research began; it is
therefore a historical perspective. The history of machines was more readily available
than that of consumables. Table 2 shows the list of the projects described in this chapter.
Model-1 through Model-5 belong to one product line, while Model-Pi and P2 belong to
another.
Table 2 - Projects in the Prior Projects Category

Machines

Consumables

Prior projects
Model-1
Model-2
Model-3
Model-4
Model-5
Model-Pi
Model-P2
1st consumable

Reconstructing the history of a company with high employee turnover is difficult,
but one engineer, Peter, has been at SIC from the beginning, hi fact, he was there when
SIC first started. His photo is in the lobby on the wall above the early models of
machines that SIC developed. He said, "I love machines. I have this fascination with
machine technology. I don't have a formal background in anything. I learned electronics
and software working at SIC. There was a need for it to be done and we were four or five
people at the time we started. So somebody had to do it and I was willing and able. I
was a hobbyist before joining SIC. I have done electronics, software, firmware, and
mechanical design on all the products. I joined SIC as a draftsman and worked on every
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one of the products." Although the historical perspective lacks details, it provides
continuity for the stories that are told.
1st consumable
According to the founder's story, he developed the first consumable and then put
together a special machine that manufactured this consumable from parts he gathered in
junkyards. At that time, these consumables worked on other manufacturer's machines.
After a time, he decided to build his own SIC machine that would use SIC consumables,
the result being Model-1.
Figure 3 shows the process that the first consumables appear to have gone
through. Today, there are 16 categories of consumables built at SIC on specialized
manufacturing equipment. New consumables continue to be developed, which drives the
development of new SIC machines. Some new consumables also require new
manufacturing technology, which can be either purchased or developed.
Model-1 machine
Model-1 was the first machine that SIC produced. Although the oldest machine,
Model-1 is the top of the line when it comes to capabilities in this product line. It is
capable of handling a number of different consumables that SIC produces, which makes
it a versatile machine. Peter, who worked on this model says, "Model-1, which was the
[first machine that SIC produced], got out on the market slowly so that you would ship
one, there would be issues, and then you would fix it and ship more." This simple
process became a pattern that was established in the early years of SIC and is one of the
patterns that can be seen in the development of products at SIC today. It is based on a
symbiotic relationship between SIC and its customers, where SIC depends on its
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customers' feedback to improve and develop its products, while the customers depend on
SIC for a machine that would allow the use of SIC s consumables to cater to their own
customers.
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Figure 3 - First Consumables Development Elements
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Although the flagship product in the product line, Model-1 still undergoes
changes, both in the form of upgrades and added features or continuation engineering.
Continuation engineering is fixing problems that are reported back from the field. Today,
Model-1 is being manufactured by SIC Manufacturing and it is still "really a prototype
that wasn't [meant to be] manufacturable. It takes [many hours] to assemble." Some say
it's "too old" technologically. Looking at it being assembled on the assembly line, there
are many parts that need to be assembled and adjusted by hand as opposed to the other
models in this product line, which have fewer parts and can be adjusted electronically.
Nevertheless, it is still the model that can handle a wide variety of consumables.
Furthermore, the "guts" of Model-1 are being integrated into a new product that will be
discussed later. Building Model-1 allowed SIC to develop a variety of other
consumables, which expanded its consumable offerings. Figure 4 shows the process that
Model-1 appears to have gone through.
Model-2 machine
Model-2 was meant to be a replacement for Model-1. According to Peter, it was
"meant to be more manufacturable than the Model-1." A prototype of it was built and it
worked. But since it did not fill a different position in the product line, it was set aside
and not pursued. Some say that there have been numerous attempts to revive Model-2,
but "some new product development pulled all the engineers off the project." This means
that another project came along that needed the resources. The reason for this decision
can be understood by looking at the importance that the company places on external
versus internal needs.
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The external needs are defined as needs that lead to growth and resource
acquisition, while internal needs are needs that lead to stability and control. The external
needs focus on the external environment and flexibility in structure, whereas the internal
needs focus on the internal environment and a control in structure (Quinn and Rohrbaugh
1983:369). External needs might require activities such as developing new products or
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changing a product to satisfy a need in the market. Internal needs might require activities
such as making a product more manufacturable or creating documentation. The former
addresses the market needs, while the latter might address Engineering or Manufacturing
needs. Although both are important, in a small company where many projects compete
for scarce resources, one typically dominates the other. Model-2 addressed an internal
need because it was to replace Model-1 as a more manufacturable product, without
satisfying a new market need. The new product development, which was an external
need, took precedence over the internal need. So, at this early stage at SIC, the external
needs won over the internal ones. This pattern was established early and is still followed.
ModeI-3 machine
According to Peter, Model-3 is a product that has a limited set of features
compared to Model-1 and handles only limited types of consumables. So, when Model-2
was abandoned, work was started on Model-3, which is smaller and less expensive than
Model-1, therefore fills a different need in the product line. Peter also mentions that a lot
of money was spent on tooling to make this model, which was technologically similar to
Model-1, but more manufacturable. What was learned on Model-1 and Model-2 was
applied to Model-3. This machine has emerged as a reliable and manufacturable model
with electronic adjustments for manufacturing.
One of the differences between the development of Model-1 and Model-3 was
that Model-1 was developed following a more experimental model, both in terms of
technology and even market needs. By the time Model-3 was being developed, many
lessons had been learned from Model-1 and 2, which were applied to it. So, Model-3 was
being developed with a different level of confidence. SIC was now knowledgeable about
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both the technical needs and market possibilities of this product line. The focus was to
produce a quality product that was manufacturable, reliable, and could be sold for less
than Model-1. Investment was made in tooling, which allowed a design that would be
more manufacturable and reliable. This type of development takes much more time and
money, and changes to such a product can be difficult because of retooling needs.
Model-3 is thus distinct since it satisfied both the external and the internal needs of the
company.
The main difference between the development processes of Model-1 and Model-3
could perhaps be attributed to a higher level of confidence in the company's knowledge
of the technology and market needs.
Model-4 machine
Every company has a legend. At SIC, it's Model-4. A local subsidiary of a
larger company had developed a machine, which filled another gap in SIC's product line.
This subsidiary was bought by SIC, which provided them this machine and its rights to it.
The machine, which was a different technology than the other SIC machines, was
modified after it was purchased, developed under an aggressive schedule with enhanced
features, and shipped out to customers. Everyone, regardless of whether they had worked
at SIC or not at the time, recounted horror stories about what happened next. One
individual outside of Engineering said, "Model-4 was a disaster from what I hear. I
wasn't here thank heavens." An engineer who wasn't at SIC at the time had this to say:

"If you send out a product before it's ready, it'll come back to haunt us. No one wants to
be put on the fast track to correct a problem like this. On the Model-4, the customer was
screaming about the product. We had a 100% failure rate. All the product had to be
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recalled. We had to scramble and make the next [revision] of the product and it took a lot
of our resources. That's when we came out with the Model-5. That works well."
Another comment about this experience was that it almost took the company down.
This fear of being haunted by problems if the job is not done well, and having to
scramble and develop a new replacement could explain the commonly recited anecdote
about engineers never wanting to let go of what they design.
In analyzing this situation, if Model-4 had been developed using the same process
as Model-1, it is possible that it would not have been a legend maker. The product would
have been shipped out in small numbers, customers would have communicated failures
back to SIC, the engineers would have responded with incremental changes and
improvements, and the risk would have been minimized. Since SIC profits from
consumables, the high cost of building the machines is not a drawback, as long as it
facilitates the sales of consumables.
It is difficult to compare the development process for Model-4 and Model-3 due
to insufficient data, but it seems that Model-3 was a known technology for SIC, whereas
Model-4 was new, or at least unfamiliar.
Model-5 machine
An engineer who joined SIC when Model-5 was being designed said, "Model-5
was a complete redesign of Model-4. That project was done differently." Model-5 is
sturdy and the least expensive model in this product line.

Some of the people who worked on Model-5 said that things were done
differently. Sam, an engineer who worked on Model-5 said, "We had a feasibility study
to get a plan, cost and time. Then the work was broken up among various engineers. We
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built a prototype, tested it, did the pilot build and then production. It was a pretty smooth
project." Another engineer who also worked on Model-5 said, "Since that was a hot
project, we had many engineers working on it and we had a good manager. He knew
what he was doing." It appears that Model-5 was developed much more cautiously.
They wanted to be sure that when it was sent out, there were not going to be any major
problems. The risk was minimized through what appears to be a more cautious and
methodical development approach. The company's reputation was at stake.
Model-Pi machine
Model-Pl machine was designed by another company some years ago. SIC
received the prototype and documentation for it so that it could manufacture it. So, the
development phase was done outside, but the manufacturing was to be done at SIC.
Model-Pl is a sophisticated design, with a special consumable. Although some of the
knowledge transfer from this outside company to SIC was explicit, there was much that
was implicit. The prototype given to SIC was the output of an engineering team in
another company, with whom SIC engineers did not appear to have had much interaction.
Although the schematics of the electronics, the software, and the mechanical drawings
were transferred in such a way so that the engineers at SIC could access and modify
them, taking the product into manufacturing appears to have been a challenge. This part
of the process, that is, development of the manufacturing plans, was the part of the PDP,
which SIC needed to complete. Peter, who was at the company when the prototype of
Model-Pl was received said, "Model-Pl was designed by an outside company. We got
the prototype and documentation from them so that we could build it here. But when we
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got it, we spent another six months or so working out the bugs, enhancing it, testing for
compliance, and testing the firmware."
Ryan, the line manager, explained that there were no manufacturing drawings.
He worked with the engineer in charge to do what was needed to get the product in
manufacturing: "It has many tiny parts. So I said we need to come up with instructions.
First, we documented all the parts. Then [the engineer] and I documented the machine
with instruction sets." In this way, they came up with a system of putting the machine
together. This special way of doing things between Engineering and Manufacturing is
something that Ryan, the line manager, allows. His tolerance for ambiguity, his ability to
work in this capacity, and his effort is what allows products to go from Engineering to
Manufacturing at SIC. Ryan is the translator of engineering knowledge to manufacturing
knowledge. In fact, he has determined the appropriate language: "Before we used to
work off these big drawings. There were three leads and each interpreted the drawings
differently. So now with these instructions, that doesn't happen."
According to Brannen and Wilson (1996:102), recontextualization is the evolution
of meaning in a new cultural context. "Some technologies and processes [are]
recontextualized to a greater extent than others. Processes with high embeddedness and a
large tacit knowledge base [are] recontextualized to a greater extent than those with low
system embeddedness and high explicit knowledge" (Brannen et al 1998:23). They
define embedded knowledge as "the degree to which technologies and processes [are]

more or less tightly integrated with other technical and social systems" (Brannen et al
1998:22).
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It appears that the product underwent recontextualization when it went from an
external engineering organization into SIC Engineering and Manufacturing. SIC
Engineering made this product their own by spending time working on the product and
doing what they thought was needed to make it meaningful for them. The line manager
worked with the engineer on the project to document the product so that it would be
meaningful for manufacturing.
Model-Pi also works with a specially designed consumable that was also
designed by the outside design company. It fills a new market space.
Model-P2
This machine was developed by a Japanese company and they continue to
manufacture it for SIC, with SIC's name and colors. SIC wants to upgrade the
electronics and software, but the manufacturer has told them that they will upgrade the
electronics, but SIC needs to find another company to upgrade the software. Therefore,
the software upgrade is being done by another company. Peter explained, "We are trying
to verify and check things out. The hardware is done in Japan and the software in
England. We verify integration and give feedback to the people." So, in this case, SIC
acted as the customer, giving feedback to those who are doing the development work for
them.
Much like Model-Pl, Model-P2 uses a specialized consumable, designed by an
outside company. It fills a new market space also.

Summary
Although this historical perspective necessarily lacks detail and does not take into
account those who were involved in product development at different times, it provides
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some insight. The company has developed a number of consumables and machines that
have allowed it to be profitable and grow from four or five employees to one hundred
twenty. The Model-1 development process allowed SIC to learn about the technology
and markets for such a product and to get on a footing where it could pursue further
projects and growth. This particular model is externally focused, it allows for
experimentation, learning, and growth, and depends on a symbiotic relationship with
customers. It, however, did not produce a product that is very manufacturable.
There does not appear to be one PDP that SIC followed for these products,
although, in some cases, the process for developing a machine appears to have been built
on the previous one. For example, Model-3 PDP was built on lessons learned from
Model-1 and Model-2, while Model-5 PDP was built on lessons learned from Model-4.
Also, the process of developing these models (Model-3 and Model-5) appears to satisfy
both the external needs, that is the market needs, as well as the internal ones, that is the
engineering and manufacturing needs.
One advantage of a process that satisfies both internal and external needs is that
the outcome is a product that is better engineered and manufacturable, while meeting a
specific market need. However, even though this would have advantages, it does not
support today's business model at SIC, which is to sell machines in low volumes and
make profits out of selling consumables in high volumes. Therefore, the effort and
expense in making a machine better engineered and more manufacturable may not, in any

significant way, add to the company's profits in the volumes at which these machines are
sold. So the internal needs are trumped by external needs, as will be seen in the
following projects.
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Another aspect of this model of balancing the internal and external needs is that it
is perceived to require a longer development cycle. The concern is that the company
would miss the market window because of the long cycle time when developing products
for fast changing or newly developing markets. Furthermore, the company will not be
able to get the kind of customer input that it does from a more externally focused PDP,
such as Model-1.
It is unclear what led to the Model-4 disaster. The 100% failure rate and the total
recall had a major impact. Some say that the product was shipped before it was
completed, while others say the problem was the person in charge of Engineering at the
time. If ethnographic data could have been obtained on the development process for
Model-4, it could have shed some light on what went wrong in this process.
There are three instances where SIC has acquired products, although in very
different forms and with different outcomes each time. One of these is Model-P2, where
the product is designed and manufactured by an outside company for SIC, with SIC's
business name and in SIC's colors. In this case, SIC is the customer. It requests
upgrades and provides feedback on the performance of changes. Another example is
Model-Pi, where another company designed the prototype, but the design is owned and
manufactured by SIC. The third example is the acquisition of the product that led to the
development of Model-4. The acquired product came with an engineer, Mark, who
develops proof of concept designs for SIC offsite. The acquired design was modified and
developed at SIC, with the outcome being Model-4. So, this model of acquiring products
may be used to obtain products or the design of products to diversify the SIC product
line. Models-Pi and Model-P2 are products in a specific product line. To develop these

36

at SIC, special expertise would have been needed. Acquisitions such as these allow for
diversification without first building this expertise. The acquisition of Model-4's precursor appears to have been for a different reason. This acquisition did not offer SIC a
new product line, but a fast track development to a different model in their existing
product line. The motivation behind this decision might have been the perception that it
would require less development effort if they acquired an existing product and modified
it.
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CHAPTER 5: PROJECTS IN PROGRESS
Projects in progress include those that had begun before the fieldwork and that
were still active. Table 3 shows the list of the projects in this category. The histories of
these projects were collected as much as possible along with ethnographic data collection
on the continuation of the project.
Table 3 - Projects in the Projects in Progress Category

Machines

Consumables

Projects in progress
Model-6
Model-7
Model-S
Model-Q
Auto-consumable
Model-Q consumable

Before discussing these discrete projects, there is an ambiguous category of
projects called "continuation engineering." These ongoing projects consume
considerable engineering resources and will be discussed first.
Continuation Engineering
Continuation engineering was estimated to consume 42% of SIC s engineering
effort (fieldnotes from bi-weekly meetings 2006:3). This was engineering effort spent on
products that had already been released to manufacturing and it was also known as
sustaining engineering. Problems that halted manufacturing, also known as "line
stoppers," were given the highest priority. One of the engineers said, "Anything that
stops or slows down manufacturing is unacceptable and needs to be dealt with fast. [The
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owner's] personal primary concern is product development. He takes for granted that
you'll support manufacturing on the side."
Another engineer said in frustration, "There is another problem that I am starting
to get involved with.. .1 keep getting pulled off to go back and do fixes on past products.
A lot of things I see are based on proper engineering not [being] done in the first place.
It's not the people, it's just the way we do things." He concluded that it was very
distracting and time consuming.
Continuation engineering is an inherent part of the PDPs at SIC. Although this is
typically a function that can be performed by a unit outside Engineering, at SIC it is done
internally. Any engineer, regardless of formal assignment, supports products he once
worked on even after they are in manufacturing. This adds to the responsibilities and
workload of engineers doing product development.
Model-6 machine
History of Model-6
Model-6 was a slightly modified version of Model-5. Small modification in the
mechanical, electronics and firmware were made so that Model-6 could handle a
consumable that was originally designed for another application. So the incentive behind
Model-6 was to sell this specific consumable, even though there were no immediate
customers.
This project started with Ed, the founder-owner, asking the manufacturing

engineer, John, to modify a certain mechanical part on the Model-5. Since Model-6 was
very similar to Model-5, through John's help Manufacturing was able to produce a small
number of the modified Model-5 machines for engineering tests. One engineer had made
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a firmware modification, while another engineer, Peter, had made some electronics
changes to this modified Model-5. Then three prototypes were built for design
confirmation. This was not a new design, but rather a modification of an existing design
to produce a new product.
Model-6 during fieldwork
The product was being tested and characterized by the Engineering Test/Design
Verification Test department. As a service to Engineering, this department performs tests
on the engineering designs to see that the designs perform as required and reports the
results back to the engineers. As a Quality Control function, they also perform tests on
products being released to manufacturing to ensure that they pass certain tests. This
function is generally performed by an independent department, although at SIC, the
manager of this department reports to the head of Engineering. Still, the need for
independent quality control is agreed on at SIC, although the result is blurred
responsibilities.
Engineering was also preparing to release the documentation package for Model-6
to Manufacturing so that its workers would know how to build the product. Therefore,
there were discussions between the firmware engineer, Bob, who was also the project
lead on Model-6, and the manufacturing engineer, John, concerning the requirements for
a release to manufacturing. These requirements were not written down, but were
discussed and negotiated instead. Two things that were being negotiated were the form
and contents of this documentation package. A new document control person had been
hired by the new vice president of Engineering and he was setting up procedures for
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documentation. This meant that there were no set rules yet, but that new ones were being
developed.
Document control departments are generally a function of Manufacturing because
they set up the documentation requirements to meet Manufacturing needs; Engineering
does not normally dictate these needs. This is another example of the blurred
responsibilities between different functional groups. Accordingly, there was conflict as
to what type of documentation and what level of documentation was enough. There were
those, like Bob, who believed that a compromise should be made as a short-term solution,
so that an interim process would allow this product to be released to manufacturing. On
the other hand, there were those, like John, who believed that a total change was needed
and if a full set of documentation was not completed at this stage, it would never be done
later.
This situation raised several questions. What was done before? Why was there a
need for change? In what way did this make the product easier to handle internally? What
change would this bring about in the interaction between Engineering and
Manufacturing? The answers to these questions differed. Someone in Engineering said,
"[Engineers] hate not having things properly documented .. .because they want to do it
right." Another individual in Engineering said, "They [engineers] don't like the fact that
the documentation is all wrong on all products." Some said that it was what was needed
for a formal release to manufacturing. But another person in Engineering said, "I think

we need to do things slowly," implying that they needed to take small steps towards the
change that they were looking at implementing. In this case, the change was defining the
procedure and documentation necessary for releasing a product to manufacturing. It
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almost seemed that being able to satisfy such an internal need was a long-awaited luxury.
The new document control person had enabled them to have this option.
Documentation defines a product explicitly. This documentation is part of the
hand-off from Engineering to Manufacturing. It includes a bill of materials that defines
the parts needed, drawings that define the parts, assembly drawings that define how the
parts are put together, and various other specifications that define various requirements
for the manufacturing of parts and the machine. At SIC, there do not appear to be formal
rules on how to do this; it seems to be an ad hoc negotiated process.
In another project, described later, this hand-off between Engineering and
Manufacturing is done as a joint effort between the two departments, while in others, the
necessary documentation starts in Engineering and is finalized in Manufacturing. How
things are done seems to differ for each project. As one person on the Manufacturing
side put it, "Engineering is a development department, but also a support for the line.
They need to work with [Manufacturing] and to learn what is needed for manufacturing
support. We need to communicate, work together, learn from each other." So, at SIC,
the line between Manufacturing and Engineering appears to be blurred; this has allowed
things such as manufacturing release documentation to fall into a gray area where a close
interaction between an individual on the Engineering side and one on the Manufacturing
side enables the release of a product to manufacturing, even without a complete or
formalized documentation package. The manufacturing release is continuously

negotiated between Engineering and Manufacturing.
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For Model-6, however, new rules were in the process of being defined as to how
explicit the knowledge transfer between Engineering and Manufacturing had to be. In
effect, this was also defining a new relationship between these two functional groups.
The more explicit the documentation, the less need for the groups to interact, and
the less ambiguous and more defined that interaction would be. The debate I observed on
Model-6 was due to a disagreement on the extent of this change in the rules of
interaction. Defining clear boundary lines between Engineering and Manufacturing
would reduce ambiguity and require more standardized ways of doing things.
Documentation satisfies an internal need; it does not directly affect the external or
customer needs. Due to limited resources, external needs take priority over internal ones.
For instance, one of the engineers who was working on the documentation for one of the
products was pulled off to work on the design of a new product. So, instead of tending to
the internal needs, the engineering resource was directed at an external need. Such
reallocation upset those people who were internally focused. The Model-6 project was
put on hold at this point. It appeared that the reason behind this decision was a lack of
interested customers.
Model-6 summary
It appears that people at SIC decided the rules based on their experience, skills,
and focus. These are then negotiated, and not just applied. Therefore, depending on the
individuals who are doing the negotiation and on the nature of the particular project,

projects can follow different processes. So, the way things are done is not rule based, but
develops through an interpretive approach and negotiations. Rules become, in effect, ex
post facto accounts of practices.
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The project to develop Model-6 was founder-owner initiated and motivated by a
need to support a special consumable. This is consistent with the SIC business model
that consumables are what make the company money and that machines are there to
support the sale of these consumables.
The functional responsibilities between Engineering and Manufacturing groups
are blurred. For instance, the Document Control function is generally under the control
of Manufacturing, but at SIC, it is in Engineering. Also, the Quality Control group is an
independent group, but at SIC, it is under the domain of Engineering. This affects the
way things are done and the reasons for this are not clear. The new vice president of
Engineering felt very strongly about having proper documentation and hired a document
control person because he saw the need for one. He felt that the Quality should be
separated from Engineering. But this did not happen during the time that he was there.
Model-S machine
History of Model-S
This project had begun a couple of years ago, driven by a new market for a
specialized consumable. It required the development of a brand new machine, which was
Model-S. Its beginnings seemed to fit the pattern of the other projects at SIC where the
founder-owner worked with a mechanical engineer to develop a proof of concept model.
Proof of concept in this case means that an idea is turned into a rough physical
model to allow the engineer to see if implementation is possible or feasible, and if the
model can perform in ways envisioned. It gives shape to the mental idea and allows the
development and testing of a number of different implementations.
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A few of these models were built by Engineering, as opposed to Manufacturing,
and shipped to customers worldwide. Each time a few machines were shipped, they
generated feedback from customers, which was incorporated into the design of each
subsequent machine. Then a few more prototypes were built and sent to more customers
and the cycle continued. So, over the past two years, 40 of these prototypes, with many
different revisions, were built and shipped, generating enormous sales of consumables,
and paying for the development of the product, based on customer feedback.
According to some, if this machine had not been developed in this manner, it
would have missed a market need. One of the engineers who worked on Model S said,
"We have a long cycle time. By the time production is making it, the product becomes
obsolete."
This process allows customer feedback, experimentation, implementation, and
production in a very similar way to Model-1 was developed. Mark, the mechanical
engineer who developed the proof of concept for Model-S said, "[Model-S] is an
enabling technology. We make small numbers and send them to customers, who help us
with our learning curve." For brand new products, such as Model-S, if there is no interest
from customers or trade shows, then SIC doesn't pursue the concept. Also, there are no
great investments made in tooling for manufacturing of these machines because the
machines are low volume. According to Ed, the founder-owner, "We don't need cheap
solutions because we don't have high volumes... The idea is to use these machines to sell
consumables." A customer will buy one machine, but many consumables, so reducing
the cost of manufacturing the machines is not a priority. This business model also
dictates the process for developing products. In this case, Model-S was developed over a
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period of time, but it is still is not considered a machine that can be manufactured
inexpensively because the focus of the development was to make a product with the right
features that worked, as opposed to making a fully manufacturable product. As the
founder-owner said, the idea was to get this machine out into the market place so that
they could sell consumables.
However, there are contradictory views on the way that Model-S was developed.
Some in Engineering say, "We are trying to get away from this [way of doing things].
The product [Model-S] has been around for two years and it has not yet been released to
manufacturing." It is not clear why there is such a disconnect between the business
model that the founder-owner has and others in Engineering.
Much like the Model-1 process, SIC found motivated customers who were
interested in the specialized consumables and were willing to work with SIC in
developing the technology needed for this new and profitable market. This important
symbiotic relationship with their customers allowed them to pursue the market. The
customers were aware that they were getting prototypes and communicated performance
issues back to SIC from the field. One of the people outside of Engineering said,
"Customers are .. .very accepting of problems because we call it beta and they have the
mindset that they can call us and tell us what the problems are. They can call us and talk
to us about it. This kind of opens up a way for us to communicate with them. It's
unusual to have one and a half years of beta, but part of this is the market." Another said,
"We [Engineering] built a number of different versions of this machine, A through L.
We built A through L in about a 24-month period. The reason for this was to sell
consumables... We made some versions of each model and sent it out."
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The consequences of this process were described as follows: "The way it was
done allowed us to evolve our learning." This learning took place as they captured the
market and made lots of money for the company. This process allowed the development
of a very unique and sophisticated machine, such as Model-S, and of a new market.
"That's helped us learn about the market and what the customers use..." This symbiotic
relationship allowed SIC to learn what the customer wanted, how the customer used their
equipment, and the problems with the prototype units. This was, in effect, the market
research portion of the PDP. After two years, the machines and the consumables have
been fine tuned to customer needs. Even though the machines are expensive to
manufacture, SIC is able to follow its business model of making money from the sales of
the consumables.
The engineer who worked offsite and the founder-owner designed the first few
revisions of Model-S. The consequent models were developed further, debugged, and
manufactured by Sam, the mechanical engineer at SIC. The engineering test/design
verification test group was bypassed; that is the Quality Control function was bypassed
because Manufacturing was not involved in making these units that were being shipped
to customers.
Figure 5 shows a summary of what appears to have been the product development
history of Model-S. To sum it up, research, development, and manufacturing of these
prototypes all occur in Engineering. There are many benefits to this process. One is that

that it helps SIC come up the learning curve with the help of its customers, who are using
these machines to sell consumables to their own customers. The implementation of the
customer feedback allows the development of a machine that caters to customer needs.
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Figure 5 - Model-S Product Development History

The risk of development is minimized, particularly in areas where both the
technology and the markets are new. This process fits the business model of making
machines to sell consumables to make a profit. Developing machines such as Model-S
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can be very expensive. This process also allows the development cost to be paid through
the profits made through the sale of the consumables, thus reducing the financial burden
of developing innovative products on a small company.
Model-S during fieldwork
Engineering was getting ready to release Model-S to manufacturing so that
Manufacturing would build the units in the future. The mechanical engineer who had
worked on this machine was involved in many different aspects of the development that
might normally require many different people with different expertise. "I make, modify,
and build it while I am thinking about it. It's much faster. If you give it to the machinist,
you need to have it well thought out and designed in CAD and then feed it into the
machinist queue, which takes days. I can do it myself fast to prove the concept." This
basically describes the process of how machines are developed and how prototypes are
manufactured by Engineering. It also describes the different functions that the
mechanical engineer fulfilled. He said, "Most engineers don't know machining. The
more you know about manufacturing processes, the easier it is to do stuff."
To release this product to manufacturing, the mechanical engineer working on
Model-S in Engineering had documented assembly instructions for Model-S. He was
working with the line manager in Manufacturing on assembling the first machine. It's
important to note at this stage that this was the first time anyone from Manufacturing had
seen how the product was being put together, even though this product had existed in 12
different revisions for the past two years and about 40 units had been shipped to different
customers.
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The mechanical engineer and the line manager were adding parts to the assembly
one at a time and the assembly instructions were being edited as needed. All the parts
needed for the machine were arranged behind them for easy access. This was taking
place in the machine assembly area, which was a part of Manufacturing. There were no
assembly drawings, but a set of assembly instructions, which had color photos of parts,
with instructions clearly marked. There was also a bill of materials that listed the parts
needed to assemble the unit. One engineer commented, "This first one will take a long
time to make because they need to find some parts, some parts don't fit and have to be
adjusted, some parts need to be de-burred. We note all these and go from there." This
still seemed like assembling a prototype and appeared very much like a learn-as-youassemble kind of process, where they were both learning from the process and each other.
Although the engineer had assembled many of these, he had not considered
manufacturing in his previous assemblies. Now, together, the line manager and the
mechanical engineer were trying to make it so that the assembly of the product could be
made more feasible for manufacturing. The idea behind this was to get most of the
assembly details worked out so that the assemblers could do their jobs without having to
worry about what type of screw to use. In other words, they were getting the details all
figured out for the assembly line. All of these details would be incorporated in the
assembly instructions that the engineer had produced. This interaction between the
engineer and his manufacturing colleague was the process of recontextualization
(Brannen et al 1998) of this technology and process. According to Brannen and Wilson
(1996:102), recontextualization is the evolution of meaning in a new cultural context.
These assembly instructions for Model-S prepared by the mechanical engineer were

50
being translated into a form that would be meaningful to those who worked on the
assembly line. The mechanical engineer passed along his explicit knowledge through the
written assembly instructions and photos, and his implicit knowledge verbally and by
helping in assembly. The line manager assembled the machine using the assembly
instructions, asked questions, and noted what could be changed to make things more
explicit or more integrated into their production system.
This translation went through another level of recontextualization when the line
manager trained the assemblers and got their feedback on what was meaningful to them.
As he put it, "they are the ones who are going to be doing it." This implied that it had to
also be meaningful for the assemblers. The line manager passed along his explicit
knowledge through the written assembly instructions, photos, and by showing the
assembly people how things should be done. In return, they provided comments, asked
questions, and made suggestions on further improvements. Anything that was still
implicit was documented and made explicit. The goal was to do what was needed so that
anyone on the line could be trained to assemble any of the machines using explicit
assembly instructions.
During this time, I observed the line manager look at parts and decide if certain
tooling would be required to put subassemblies together. The purpose of this was to
make assembly easier and faster. He looked also to see if he could recommend the use of
parts that were already in house to Engineering, as opposed to the using brand new ones.

So this knowledge transfer was not just from Engineering to Manufacturing. Since this
was just the first manufacturing model, the assumption was that there was still room for
change. The line manager would then communicate this information back to Engineering
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and see if they could change some parts to in-house ones, that is, parts that were used in
previous machines. All of this was done for the purpose of making things easier and
faster to assemble, thus further recontextualizing the process and technology. The second
machine was built using the instructions that had been appropriately translated.
For the past two years, Engineering had manufactured the machines that helped
sell many consumables. Now the product was being released to manufacturing so that
Manufacturing could take over the manufacturing function because an order of 50 ModelS machines needed to be filled.
This process of hand-off is still part of the development process. Planning for
manufacturing on this project is not something that occurred totally in Engineering, but
also during manufacturing. This does not actually make the machines more
manufacturable, but it allows Manufacturing to build them. That is, it is the minimum
requirement to get through production. The process of continuous iterative design for
Model-S made it difficult for Manufacturing to get involved during the design phase.
Those on the manufacturing side commented that it was a waste of time to get involved
because the product kept changing. So the process where the line manager built the first
unit was, in effect, to make up for the lack of manufacturing input.
In some industries, the front-end activity required before product design, which is
called research, may or may not be considered a part of the PDP. In the research phase of
new products, new technology is developed for incorporation into new products (Otto

and Wood 2001:6). In large organizations, research is separated from the PDP. Research
is used to develop new technology to the point that the product development teams can
readily adopt it. In this way, product development does not get bogged down by research
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(Otto and Wood 2001:6). At SIC, for Model-S, the research phase was included in the
PDP. The line between research and product design was blurred. At times, research was
not just the front end of product design, but the two phases seemed blurred as the product
was developed.
It is possible that the machine could have been designed to be more
manufacturable if manufacturing input had been present during the design phase. Design
for manufacturability is a function that incorporates design features into a machine during
the development phase to make it more manufacturable. Design for Manufacturing is not
likely to occur in the research phase because it is not a relevant function to this phase
since it is an experimental phase where frequent changes may occur. However, it is a
relevant function in the development phase because the product is nearly ready to be
manufactured. At SIC, research and development are blurred and proceed together. So
as the engineer is incorporating customer feedback as a research function, the product is
also undergoing development, that is, the design is being improved, certain design for
manufacturability features are incorporated, certain documentation is done, and so on.
But what manufacturing saw was a product that was constantly changing, so the process
was more akin to research. Therefore, manufacturing did not get involved to contribute
to design for manufacturability prior to the machine being released to manufacturing.
Still, it is difficult to see how Engineering managed to manufacture 40 machines without
manufacturing getting involved. This means that the design engineer was involved in
research, development, and in manufacturing, all within Engineering. In fact, in this
particular case, Engineering was acting as a company all on its own, which interfaced
with the customer, did research, product development, and manufacturing.
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The delivery of the wrong part by a bearing supplier exemplifies the cost of doing
business this way. This occurred the first time that Manufacturing was going to build the
machines. A bearing that SIC had ordered was correctly specified by Engineering at SIC,
but was incorrectly filled by the bearing supplier. This caused anxiety and delays. It also
caused some debate around the issue of why these parts had not been ordered ahead of
time. Since Manufacturing had had the bill of materials for at least four months, the
question that arose was why some of these new parts had not been ordered much earlier
so that sub-assemblies could have been started. Problems would also have been detected
and dealt with earlier to minimize delay. The debate was that since Manufacturing had
known that such an order had to be delivered, they had not ordered these parts in a timely
way so as to allow for such problems to be corrected without causing schedule slips. A
margin of error had not been incorporated, for whatever reason. At this stage, it appeared
as if Engineering and Manufacturing departments had not worked to the same plan.
Another serious issue, which was both a vendor issue and perhaps also related to
how things were done or to lack of resources, further added to the stress of those working
on the project and the delayed shipment. Some of the parts that came in did not meet the
specifications drawn up by Engineering. This problem had not been caught when the
parts were received from the vendor. Now, there was no time to send them back, so the
engineer machined them himself. This was the mechanical engineer responsible for the
design of Model-S. He was also involved in helping Manufacturing build these machines

and now he was going to be machining the parts. When I commented on the number of
hats he wore, he said, "We do what we need to get the job done." This was not just what
he said, but it was what he actually did. I noticed that there were various other problems
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with parts from vendors that needed to be changed during this process. Some pushed for
a design change for the next build of these machines.
An older technology electronics board had an unusually high drop out rate
because the vendor was apparently putting them together by hand. This high drop out
rate was a concern because enough boards had not been ordered to compensate. This
board was also used in other machines. As one individual put it, "They've scheduled and
planned 50 Model-S's. They have bought 51 sets of parts, which would be OK for a
mature product, but it isn't for something like this for the first production run." It was
not clear why this had occurred. Some said that better planning would have allowed an
earlier start on new parts and therefore more margin for error on a new product for
manufacturing. It was unclear why this had not happened or who was responsible for the
overall product. Perhaps one reason for what had happened can be explained by the
following comment made by a person in Engineering: "Things should be more routine
than they have been. It seems that everything we do is an exception to the rule. We
shouldn't have to struggle to figure out how to do things that can be routinized." For this
individual, the release of a product to manufacturing should have been routine. At SIC,
this process was different for different products.
It appeared that no one was responsible for the overall process. Each department
was doing its own thing and there was little coordination or communication between
departments that interfaced across projects. These problems discussed above caused

serious delivery delays, not to mention a stressful environment for engineers.
Another issue that came up during this rush to manufacture and ship these ModelS units was that one of the parts was mechanically wrong. The design of one part that
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interfaced with it had changed, but changes had not been carried through for all the
others. So there was a mismatch between two parts that needed to fit together. Due to
the rush and anxiety to ship, this became very stressful for the engineer on the project.
One of the explanations that was given to me by some of the engineers was that because
of the numerous iterations that took place on Model-S, without allowing time for the
documentation to catch up or for a systems test with each change, these kinds of mistakes
were not only to be expected, but really inevitable. Another comment I heard from a
number of different people in Engineering and Manufacturing was that the Model-S
production release had turned into a mess "because there was no process." One engineer
said, "Things can go wrong by not following proper engineering processes." This
process was explained as follows: "Something like ISO allows you to have everyone
bobbing up and down in step, even if it's not the best step, at least it's the same step, hi
larger companies, technicians do technician work, electronics engineers do electronics,
mechanical engineers do mechanical engineering, and so on. In a small environment, you
do what ever is required to get the job done. [So] it adds chaos. It's something that runs
on its own. Now you have many heads bobbing up and out of sync doing their own gig.
In a two-man operation, it's essential. Even here, it can be [essential] as long as the
interface between departments are properly structured." He perceived that a process or a
more rule-based way of doing things would reduce some of the chaos that he saw and
allow people to work more in concert with others, particularly at the boundary between
different groups. So, everyone at this stage was doing whatever he or she could, but lack
of rules to follow had made things much harder. Specific examples given were the

56

communication process, or lack thereof, between the various departments and between
SIC and outside vendors.
Another consequence of this process was what came up in a status meeting for the
manufacturing release of Model-S. A specific design issue was raised at this late stage.
The fact that this kind of issue was being brought up when the product was going into
Manufacturing prompted an engineer to comment, "this is happening all over the place
and people are getting hammered." He was indicating that the problem was systemic and
affected other projects. That is, problems were arising in different projects and people
were having to scramble to fix them under pressure. Model-S had been under
development now for two years, but it looked like there were still some design issues that
needed attention.
It is not clear why this was happening. Some thought that the machines were just
prototypes and had problems. What is meant by prototype is that Engineering had been
putting together these machines for shipment to customers. So the machine had not even
gone through the Quality Control functions. Since these prototypes had allowed the
company to make money from the sale of consumables, the quality was not seen as an
issue. How quality was incorporated into SIC's business plan or if this was considered a
quality issue by everyone remained unclear, as did who defined quality in this type of
process. One of the views expressed by an engineer who opposed this type of PDP was
"The original party line is that we want to get customer feedback on features, but in
reality, this approach has sold a ton of consumables, hi fact, I asked Ed if we could get
some customer feedback on features. He said no. No customer would be willing to do
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this. They don't have time or the interest... we haven't gotten any valuable feedback on
features."
There are some difficulties with managing such a development process. One such
difficulty was described by an engineer who worked on the project: "Each time we built
the prototype, it was shipped to customers..." The problem with this approach was that
the engineer didn't have a machine to work on any more, so further development was
hampered by lack of available machines. Another problem was expressed by another
engineer: "We build the machines and need to tune the process for different consumables.
Once you ship it, you need to make another machine. A lot of these parts for these
machines are one off," by which he meant they were custom-made, one at a time. So to
build another machine that acts the same way was a challenge. This made development
of these machines very difficult and a time consuming venture for Engineering.
Others expressed similar views. That is, it was difficult for Engineering to work
on the machine to improve its design when the product was being developed this way: as
soon as a machine was built by Engineering, it was to be shipped to a customer.
Therefore there weren't any machines available to work on and to fully test and
characterize. An individual made the comment "The main problem is that they are
willing to get the product out the door if it works most of the time." It appears that there
was some ambiguity in the area of quality as seen internally.
In this case, it is not clear how the decision to release Model-S to manufacturing
was made. This handoff to Manufacturing required Engineering and Manufacturing to
work closely together. Since SIC had a large order for shipment for Model-S at this
point, perhaps a decision to release to manufacturing was made based on the numbers
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that had to be built. Up to this point, Engineering had been putting these units together
for shipment to customers in smaller numbers. It is not clear what criteria were used to
decide that Model-S was ready to be released to manufacturing because of the absence of
an explicit process or the presence of a process that was not the same for every product.
Model-S summary
Figure 6 shows the process that Model-S appears to have gone through and would
be likely to go through after shipping to customers. It is similar to the process of Model1. This is a highly externally focused process. In the process of developing Model-S,
Engineering performed many different functions; this included research, development,
and manufacturing. The skills that the mechanical engineer on this project possessed
were also diverse and crossed different functional groups; some of these were machining,
design and development, and making prototypes. The market research function is very
much a part of this process.
The advantages to this way of doing things are many. For new technologies and
new markets, it reduces the risk of entry by limiting the resources required to test out the
market. It is a fast and inexpensive way of finding out if a product has potential. It also
allows for the development of innovative technologies to be financed with the sales of the
consumables that it enables. It is also a process that allows a product to evolve according
to customer needs. This process is possible only if the company's customers also benefit
from it. In this case, SIC would make money by selling its consumables, while the

customers would make money by offering a service to their customers using SIC
machines and consumables. So they would have an incentive to work with SIC to
develop this technology.
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This way of doing things, however, has consequences, which, if known, can be
addressed. These have been described in detail above. The internal needs appears to be
sacrificed for external needs. The product remains in Engineering, where almost the
whole PDP occurs. There does not appear to be an outside person who, much like a
project manager, would facilitate communication, planning, and coordination between
Manufacturing and Engineering on a project basis. This causes problems. Although this
process satisfies the business model, neither the business nor development models are
explicit. It is difficult to see what or how quality fits in the process. Often the criteria
used for going to the next step are not clear, for instance, the decision to release the
product to Manufacturing.
More details about what happened next to Model-S are provided later.
Model-7 machine
History of Model-7
Model-7 is a modified Model-1. This machine is sold with a Model-S to produce
a quality of output for the special consumables that Model-S handles. Much like ModelS, the founder-owner and a manufacturing engineer, who modified a Model-1 to build
Model-7, started the project. Prototypes of Model-7 were built in Engineering and
shipped to customers worldwide with each Model-S.
The story of how it all started is told by an individual in Engineering:
"Ed was working with the manufacturing engineer to make changes to the

Model-1 for the first version of Model-7. So the first few units were that
way. The marketing person and another technician built some more of
those units, which went out to customers for feedback. Then Ed was still
experimenting. He decided he would do some firmware changes instead
of mechanical.. .He was able to get some good [results] that way. Then
Jim [mechanical engineer] was given the unit that Ed was experimenting
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with to do improvements. None of the ones that Jim worked on has gone
out to customers. The machines that the marketing person has built had
20-30 parts that were different from Model-1. Ben [the marketing person]
sent many of these to customers. He keeps track of it. The ones that Jim
is working on have less than five parts that are different. Ed's ultimate
goal is to have one machine that can do all the different consumables..."
Another individual told the same story from a different perspective.
"At first Ed modified Model-1 so that they could be shipped to customers.
These were mechanical changes and calibration changes that he had made
to Model-1. When Ben started, he took apart the machine and with the
help of John [the manufacturing engineer] tried to document what changes
Ed had done. This was to take the burden off Ed. So they were
developing the product with a developing market. They took 15 offline
and made changes to a dozen pieces, that then with Model-S were shipped
off to a customer. In 18 months, they shipped off about 15 machines, but
this translated into many consumables. So now, they are building to
order.. John [manufacturing engineer] made drawings to get the machine
shop to do parts so that they had some consistency. Ed was building these
to order before that. The ones that now Jim is working on are the same.
Jim has done lots of experiments that have eliminated parts and simplified
the design. So this is closer to Model-1. He tested to see if the changes
Ed had made were needed. He found that only a few were needed. He has
also been doing documentation and so on. He is doing what I call
productizing it. Prior to Jim, John and Ben had to get parts built in house
to get the Model-Is modified. Now production is going to do it all."
These stories are very similar. They both tell the story of how this product was
developed. The founder-owner had an idea and made certain changes to prove the
concept. He did this by building different prototypes and shipping them to customers for
feedback. The marketing person and the manufacturing engineer who took over
documented these changes so that they could produce these prototypes more consistently.
These prototypes, much like Model-S, were manufactured in Engineering, on an as
needed basis. They were shipped with each Model-S.
The marketing person, who has a masters degree in mechanical engineering, was
involved in getting the changes documented and also put the product together physically
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for shipment to the customer. This is a function he performed for Engineering because
Engineering was manufacturing these units for shipment to customers. This meant that
he worked outside his functional group. In fact, although he worked in Engineering to
put these units together, he was actually doing something that the Manufacturing group
would normally do. So, he worked not only outside his functional group, but also outside
of the group that he was helping.
For reasons that are not clear, the mechanical engineer, Jim, got involved to
develop and characterize the design, make the machine operate consistently with a
minimum of mechanical changes, and make it manufacturable. This is what one of the
individuals called productizing. According to Otto and Wood (2001:6), this research is
used to develop new technology to the point that the product development teams can
readily adopt it. Thus, Jim began a new phase. The phase prior to this can be regarded as
the research phase, where the proof of concept for the new Model-7 had been performed
to the point that Jim took over. He worked to develop and characterize the product and
make it ready for manufacturing. So, unlike Model-S, the research and development
phase for Model-7 were done in parallel, by different people, as distinct projects.
Model-7 during fieldwork
Jim, who worked on Model-7, frequently consulted the founder-owner and the
marketing person on the quality of the output. There was no explicit documentation to
indicate what changes in the machine's firmware would produce a specific change in

output. These three people involved in fine-tuning the output quality appear to depend on
experimentation and much implicit knowledge. The engineer who worked on this said,
"Before I didn't have much experience with [how to control the output of the machine].
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When I first started, I really didn't know. But now, by doing a lot of different
[experiments with the machine], I've learned through experience what parameters affect
what. Also, I have good documentation to remind me what I've done. You can change a
lot by changing those firmware parameters." He needed to convert this knowledge
gained from experimentation to some external form so that he could remember what he
had learned. Of course, if he left the organization, his knowledge would become implicit
again and the newcomers would have to start over, unless the documentation were
useable by others. This is a steep learning curve and likely to be expensive to build up or
to lose. When I asked him what parameters would need to be changed to fix a problem,
he said "Oh, it's complicated. There are a few of them that I need to try out." So even
when he thought he knew what needed to be done, he still had to experiment. It's too
complicated and there is a lot of tacit knowledge that's built through experimentation.
Furthermore, quality is tactile and judged visually, so it is somewhat subjective and based
on tacit knowledge.
Jim showed me hundreds of experiments he had done and the subtleties in the
results that differentiated good and poor results. He had photographs of what happened
with the machines and where the problems occurred after they were used for a while. He
also talked about how slight firmware changes or calibration differences could make a
big difference in the quality of how a machine worked and how it handled a consumable.
He had learned all this by trial and error, and documented it so that he would not forget
what he had learned. He communicated his findings with the founder-owner and the
marketing person by showing them the output and asking them for their feedback. Each
would give him different ideas to try.
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Model-7 and Model-S were both being prepared to be released to manufacturing
at the same time. However, the situation with Model-7 was very different from Model-S
when it came to manufacturing release. Jim said, "The machine is 95% same as Model-1,
which the Manufacturing knows how to build.. .We'll work with production to get the
first ten Model-7s built." The release for Model-7 was not the same as the release for
Model-S because of this factor. Model-7 was much simpler and did not involve the same
close working relationship between Engineering and Manufacturing that Model-S had
required. The engineer provided the necessary changes to the line manager in
Manufacturing. Manufacturing didn't appear to need much help because they were
already very familiar with this machine. The engineer said, "Manufacturing had pretty
much built these by themselves based on their knowledge of building Model-Is." He was
referring to the first few units that Manufacturing built after the Engineering hand-off of
Model-7.
Model-7 summary
Figure 7 shows the process that appears to have been used for Model-7. Although
this is externally focused, it is different than Model-1 or Model-S. It appears that Model7 has undergone more distinguishable research and development phases. The research
phase is where the proof of concept and experimentation of different approaches are
done, while the development phase is where the output from the research phase is
developed for consistency and made more manufacturable. These phases appear
intertwined and difficult to distinguish in Model-1 and Model-S.
The marketing person had a mechanical engineering background, which allowed
him to function outside of his functional group. This demonstrates how people involved
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in product development perform tasks that are outside their functional responsibilities.
Much like the mechanical engineer who worked on Model-S, this type of skill is another
factor that drives PDPs.
Owner sees a need for
Model-7. He makes
modifications to
Model-1 to make
a model-7
Customer
feedback

Research
Phase

Ship to customers along with
Model-S

Marketing manager & manufacturing eng.
get involved. They document what owner
did, build more units in Engineering.
Owner continues to experiment
on different ways of improving
Model-7.

Customer Ship to customers along with
feedback Model-S on an as needed basis

Decide on an approach
Development
Phase

<

Mechanical engineer takes over.
Develops design, characterizes it
& makes it manufacturable.

Release to manufacturing

Figure 7 - Model-7 Development Elements

These practices have some advantages. The research phase was fast and did not
require too many resources. It allowed feedback from customers to be incorporated into
the product. The development phase then produced a machine that was consistent in
function and manufacturable. Alone, Model-7 would not have been a product; it was
developed to support Model-S. Precisely what motivated this separation of research and
development is unclear, and may reflect Jim's role in the development or other factors.
More details about what happened to Model-7 are provided below.
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ModeI-7 and Model-S
Model-7 and Model-S during fieldwork
The first few machines of Model-7 and Model-S that were now being built by
Manufacturing were for design verification test. This is where the engineering
test/design verification test department took some of the first units built by
Manufacturing and tested them to simulate how a customer would use them. Everyone
talked about this way of doing things as if it were the normal process, although it was not
written anywhere. It seemed to be the next step for the product that everyone took for
granted and agreed on. This design verification test was, in effect, the Quality Control
portion of the process. As mentioned before, at SIC, this function was in Engineering
and posed a certain conflict of interest. If and when problems were encountered in design
verification test on the first few units built by Manufacturing, Engineering was
responsible for correcting them; thus the conflict of interest.
Model-S and Model-7 were machines that were designed to work together. They
were manufactured and shipped together from Engineering, but they were now built by
Manufacturing. There appeared to be a different process for making a decision on
whether these products should be shipped to the customer. There did not appear to be a
formal process for making this decision; that is, no one was sure about what criteria
would be used to determine if these products were ready for shipment. So even though
these products had been shipped to customers as prototypes, since they were now built by
Manufacturing, it appeared that a different set of criteria was needed to determine
whether they should be shipped. As one individual noted, "In the absence of a quality
person [i.e. a Quality Control individual], everyone needs to be able to make a decision.

67

It needs to be a decision owned by everyone." This comment needs clarification. The
person in charge of design verification test is also the Quality Control person. However,
she reports to the head of Engineering and does not have the authority to determine if
something should be shipped or not.
To decide whether Model-S and Model-7 should shipped, a meeting was called
where everyone who was associated with the project in the functional groups of
Marketing, Engineering, Manufacturing, and the CEO were invited to see the engineering
test/design verification test manager describe in detail the results from numerous tests
performed using Model-S and Model-7. The goal was to make a joint decision on
whether or not the machines could be shipped. During this meeting, the tests and the test
results were presented, as well as many details related to the machines. However, there
were no specifications to compare the results with, so the numbers were difficult to
interpret in isolation. As one individual indicated, "It's unclear for me what we are using
as metrics." Problems were identified, but it was unclear what these meant in terms of
shipment; that is, whether they were going to stop shipment. Who was responsible to
make this decision was also unclear.
The standard that machine performance was compared with was not an explicit
company specification, but some implicit standard and perhaps a standard based on
experience that was not shared by everyone. There were disagreements on the test
procedure, test results, and meaning of results. A meeting that took almost two hours left
people confused and unable to make a decision.
The tests that were carried out were meant to be black box tests, meaning that the
approach to testing was to simulate customer usage of the machines. It seemed that there
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was confusion about their purpose among those at the meeting. One individual said, "We
should be careful not to merge R&D testing with this type of black box testing.. .If these
results are not good, then we should go back to Engineering and look to see what we need
to do." Some argued about the appropriate test, about interpreting the results, about how
the test was conducted, and about whether the problems were significant or not.
One senior manager who attended the meeting remarked: "This is why we are all
here. This is a qualitative decision. We need to look at the results and then decide." The
decision to ship was going to be made by consensus and by how the output looked, but
not necessarily by the numbers that were shown in the test results. The numbers in the
results were not compared to a standard defined by SIC, but by some metrics specified by
the manufacturer of the test equipment. Furthermore, no one seemed to really understand
how to interpret the results, except perhaps those involved in testing. One individual,
frustrated, commented, "We need to look at the [test] data and understand it."
Another interpretation of this scene is that perhaps this was to be a shared
decision because the consequences of that decision needed to also be shared. It wasn't
about numbers, but about collectively discovering the criteria for shipping.
Someone mentioned problems with the consumables. This appeared to come as a
surprise. The consumables that were used for testing were not within specification, even
though they came from Manufacturing stock. Now there was the issue of the
consumables to contend with, along with the known electronics, mechanical, and
software issues, which the design verification test tests had also revealed.
Finally, someone recommended that everyone move into the conference room so
that "we put all of this on a white board and decide what is a stop ship." In the
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conference room, someone commented, "We can't make specification decisions. We
need Ed [the owner] here." So it was decided that they would not make any decisions on
specifications. After two years of product development, there did not appear to be a
written specification. The founder-owner appeared to be the one who had this knowledge
and he was needed if a change in specification was to be made. However, when it came
to determining criteria for shipment, a key individual in the group said, "We don't have
to push for performance because there is no competition that's doing this. So we don't
have to be perfect. When we have a 'spec'[specification] change, we need to write it out
and say this team is recommending this 'spec' change." This team included members
from Engineering, Marketing, and Manufacturing. Someone said, "The problem is I
don't know what the spec is." The response to this was, "The process is we put
something out. If we don't hear anything for 24 hours, then it becomes official." Among
many things, this appears to indicate ambiguity about what was acceptable quality and
criteria for product shipment. It was an interpretive process in which how things were
done was based on the person making the decision. At this point, people were
negotiating what was acceptable and what was not.
A 'stop shipment' would affect the company's income, so this was a difficult
decision. The ambiguity of specifications, the individualistic manner in which
development had proceeded, problems that didn't make anyone in Engineering feel
comfortable about shipping the next day, conflict between what is acceptable and what is
not, the need for consensus, lack of a clear or agreed upon specification, a casualness
about quality, and other factors made this a situation that was difficult to control or to
shape. All the problems seemed to come out all at once. Lack of time and pressure to
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ship put people on the defensive. It was decided to postpone shipping for a few days so
specific issues could be resolved.
Simultaneously, a new director of product marketing was hired. The immediate,
noticeable influence that she had was that she took notes at meetings, and shared them
and matrices of action items or problems with others who attended the meeting. No one
wrote down anything that happened in meetings, except the ethnographer. People would
walk out of meetings and carry information in their heads. A consequence was, as one
person commented, "We come out of [a]... meeting with no conclusions, no document,
no outcome."
The next few days were spent battling various technical problems on both
machines. The next meeting included only Marketing and Engineering. A decision had
been made to stop shipment and fix some problems. There was a written list of problems
that they were going through. This new habit of writing things down seemed to have
caught on. Now, status and progress were being monitored in writing and everyone
seemed to be working together. When the final corrections were done, the machines
were shipped. But some of the revenue for the year was lost due to late shipment.
When asked what they thought could have been done differently, there were a
number of different answers. One individual said, "The problem is leaving things to the
11th hour. A whole bunch of things could have been ordered and put together a long time
ago so that we would have seen problems and resolved them." Another two individuals,

from different departments, said that they had never seen the vice president of operations
attend any design reviews, implying that this lack of coordination between Manufacturing
and Engineering is what caused the delays in ordering and getting started earlier.
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The process also affected support of the product after shipment to customers.
When a product evolves like Model-S and Model-7, the different versions in the hands of
the customers may require repair or technical support. Some of the versions have no or
little documentation. So the question that many asked about providing technical support
was, "Which version do you support?" The only answer that I heard was that this was not
as yet required, because the products shipped did not have a problem.
Model-7 and Model-S summary
In the absence of a set of rules to follow, the PDP is fundamentally an interpretive
endeavor. The criteria for decisions are negotiated and decisions made are at best
consensual.
It seems that at SIC most practices, concerns, expectations, and knowledge were
implicit and were expressed verbally. The explicitly written test results were also seen as
ambiguous and were interpreted differently by different people. Even the seemingly
explicit could be negotiated.
Model-Q
History of Model-Q
A project that had started shortly before this research began was Model-Q. The
prototype, which was seen as having been "thrown together," was a great success at a
trade show in September. Model-Q was different from any other product that SIC
offered. So, technically, this was a new challenge. It also required new consumables.
Model-Q during fieldwork
I attended the first meeting in early October, which all personnel from
Engineering, Industrial Design, Marketing, and the CEO attended after the trade show.
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Ed, the founder-owner said, "We need to offer congratulations on what you were able to
pull off for the show." Apparently, this new prototype had been put together in a short
six weeks. Paul, the vice president of Engineering asked, "Where do we go from here?"
The answer to this question became the topic of this meeting. There was much
discussion about what needed to be done technically on the machine and on the
consumables, which special features needed to be preserved, the level of interest at the
trade show, the target market, and the pricing strategy. While people who attended the
trade show seemed very excited, others seemed cautious or anxious.
Ed, who was the product champion, clearly drove what was going to be done. He
said "We want to do a redesign and target to build 20 units and get 15 or so into the field
and have users use them and provide feedback." So, the extent of the redesign was being
discussed. What was going to be done was not clear in anyone's mind because they
lacked the time to analyze the machine and understand everything that needed to be
changed. The extent of changes was also unclear and was going to take time to
determine. Also, building 20 machines was going to require considerable time and
resources, which was a concern among those in Engineering.
Bob, an engineer, said, "It is a lot of work. We are overloaded. Just want to
make sure this is a good idea."
The CEO said, "It is not a question that this is a betting exercise."
Ed, the founder-owner said, "Talk to those who were at the show to see what they
say," implying that there was no question that this was a great idea.
On one hand, there was excitement about the product and the positive reception it
had received, while on the other hand there was concern about devoting resources to what
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could be a big risk. The conflict was between those who looked outwardly and saw
opportunities, which got them very excited, and those who looked at what lay ahead
internally at the work required to get the job done. They saw a great deal of effort for
what the CEO called a "betting exercise."
Paul, the vice president of Engineering, said, "I am up to my eyeballs in things."
One could see that this was causing a degree of concern and anxiety among those
who were going to be possibly involved in doing this job.
The CEO: "If we could have the machine as is for the customer to look at?"
Ed: "They'll come back and ask for more."
The CEO: "Would you turn down an order for 200?"
Ed: "Yes. It needs to go through another iteration and solve some problems."
The trade show acted as both market research and field trials for Model-Q
machine and consumable. The market research showed positive results and the field
trials point to what needed to be changed in the product design. Ed said that there was a
good deal of engineering still to do on the project and perhaps some new resources could
be sought from outside to perform it. Ultimately, Paul and Fred decided to look for a
new mechanical engineer to fulfill this role.
Since these were going to be sent to customers for feedback, the product was
expected to go through further iterations. So this was both the research phase and the
development phase because problems that had been found were going to be corrected.
Research and development phases were thus intertwined.
Finally, the meeting ended and nothing was written down: there were no action
items, no next step, nor documentation of any decision on who would do what next.

74

The next meeting included personnel from Engineering, Industrial Design,
Manufacturing, Product Marketing, the founder-owner, and the CEO. It began with
discussions of how exciting it was to be at a prestigious show with such an impressive
product. Those who had gone to the show were very excited.
Bob: "So one of the things that happens at these shows is market research. It's
interesting to hear about the competition. Did anyone take pictures?" The founder-owner
said "yes" and explained that they had seen many others who were trying to do this.
The perception at SIC was that trade shows, in general, allowed those attending to
learn about the competition, evaluate how SIC's products measured up, and study the
products of other companies. This is one of the ways market research was done at SIC.
In this Model-Q meeting, Ed, the founder-owner reiterated what he had said in the
first meeting about what he thought should happen as the next step.
Ed: "We need to get a design that we can build 20 from... so that we can get it in
the hands of customers."
Peter, an engineer, said, "We design for sale, then it's different."
CEO: "Why can't we sell prototypes?"
What Peter implied here was that if this was going to be a prototype, then the
approach taken to get a design to build 20 would be different than if it was going to be a
developed design that would be for sale. This is probably why the CEO responded as he
did. The reason for the question that Peter asked may be the experience that Engineering
had gone through for the past two years with the prototypes of Model-S and Model-7
being sold as part of the development process of these two products.
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John, the manufacturing engineer, said, "We get locked into things that way.
Once things get locked down, people always say there is no time afterwards. What we
need to do is to start with a design spec."
This is the familiar pattern of conflict between internal and external concerns. As
defined previously (Quinn and Rohrbaught 1983), the external concerns are about
producing a product that will allow the company to enter a new and evolving market.
This means that the product may evolve as the market evolves. To capture the market
changes, prototypes are sold to customers, who then provide feedback. Their feedback is
quickly integrated into the next revision of the prototype. This way of proceeding allows
the development of machines and consumables through customer feedback. However,
internally, the manufacturing engineer perceives that the product development cycle
begins with a design specification, which contains more explicit design requirements.
The concern that he is expressing is that the product won't be changed after the initial
design. He sees this approach as one that locks in a design, which may not be optimum.
His idea of the way things should be done is also tacit.
Paul: "Yes. We have that, but what we need is a cost spec."
CEO: "At SIC, Ed gets an idea of a project and things like this happen. I
was very impressed with the idea and a tremendous effort. This morning
we had a customer from the show talking about this product. I walked
him through this exercise to see what we can sell it for. This in turn has a
constraint as well. That [trade show] is in March. [This meeting was
taking place in mid-October] They [the customer representatives] want to
pilot one of these machines with consumables... so that they can test and
announce this product at the [trade show]. They don't need many

machines. This is the good and bad news. Here we have a live evidence
of market needs. This is just another data point, but an encouraging thing.
Discouraging piece is that it is another new product when we have our
hands full. What we need to do is to come up with an easy way to do this.
We can use the people that are in this room or part of the group in this
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room to do this. We are not in the business of making money on the
machines per se. It's the consumables we make money on."
So, here, the CEO reiterates the business model that money is made on the
consumables.
Paul: "How do we come up with a spec for market on the cost?"
Ed: "The driving force is the time to market. We need it to work well and
have it fast."
CEO: "Cost reduction is for volume. You are talking about volumes
we've not seen."
Ed: "Quality, cost, speed. We can't have all three."
CEO: "I disagree. We can have all three. It's a matter of degree. A good
team can have 80% of all three." There was no reaction out of
Engineering on this comment. They were very quiet. Things felt
uncomfortably tense in the room.
Ed: "At high volumes, you have [various processes] that push schedules
out to 9 months. That's real price reduction. Three years ago, we would
have gone and done the long range slow process of cost reduction. Today,
we're going to do low volume, expensive techniques to get things out
fast." This mention of three years may be significant. This is when the
new business model was adopted and the CEO came on board SIC. An
individual who had been at SIC at that time told me "Three years ago, the
bank pulled our loan. We were all scrambling. There were major
layoffs."
The CEO and Ed had spelled out the development process that supports the
business model of selling machines and making a profit from the consumables. The
founder-owner had expressed the requirements that the process should meet, that is, "We
need it to work well and have it fast." So quality and speed were the two requirements, at
least according to the founder-owner. But at the same time, the CEO had a different idea;
he thought quality, speed, cost at 80% was what a "good team" can accomplish. These
different views were both expressed at one meeting where the direction of product
development was to be determined. These views has different implications for product

development.
In the meeting, the conversation turned to what needed to be done next.
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Paul: "We need a plan. Phase 1 is trade show, phase 2, is this or that?" There was
no clear answer as to what needed to be done next or the expectations for the next phase
so that Engineering could gear up for it.
CEO: "The thing that scares me is that we have a company to turn and we have
this other product. I just want to remind the team that not everyone will be able to work
on this project because we have other projects to run. It's a tricky balancing act. If we
don't pay attention to the core business, we don't have any money to run the show."
What the CEO meant is that SIC had limited resources in Engineering, some of
which were needed for manufacturing support. It was close to the end of the year and
large orders needed to be shipped for the company to make money. Additionally,
Engineering was also handing off new products to Manufacturing. The CEO was
concerned that the significant effort required on Model-Q might cripple the company if it
interfered with what they were doing now to keep the company going.
It seemed that even the founder-owner and the CEO were defining the work that
needed to get done and the process that the project would follow. The founder-owner
wanted to go through another iteration of the machine to implement lessons learned from
the trade show so that the product could be sent out to the customers for more feedback.
The CEO was concerned about balancing the need to keep the company alive by shipping
products and the need to get done what the founder-owner wanted. The founder-owner's
focus was the product, while the CEO's was balancing of resources.
Another meeting was scheduled to discuss the technical details of the changes.
The engineer who had designed the prototype said, "I am not the right person to do the
production design." Paul explained, "We need to get feedback from customers. This is
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an evaluation thing." The meeting ended and again there were no decisions made about
who was going to do what, if anything.
There appeared to be two groups in Engineering who were working on this
product. One group involved Mark, the mechanical engineer, who had developed the
first Model-Q under the direction of the founder-owner, while the other group was Greg,
the electronics consultant, and Bob, the firmware engineer, who worked under the
direction of Paul, the vice president of Engineering. There did not appear to be much
communication between the two groups. Actually, the founder-owner was in charge of
the mechanical design, while Paul was in charge of the electronics and the firmware. The
decision made in the next meeting was to produce some 10 units for January first and
order parts to build 100 in March.
Paul: "So, we are going for 100 pieces [that is for March]. So this design is going
from zero to maturity in two months. Why do you think we can do that?"
Ed: "We are not talking about your kind of maturity."
Paul: "What if the world goes gaga after the 100 and they want 1000 [Model-Q
machines]. How are we going to handle that?"
Mark: "This is what we have to do anyway to start off now."
Paul: "Do we need to talk about offshore manufacturing now if we are going to
have high volumes? It takes time to set up these partnerships."
Mark: "We can send these over to overseas for an evaluation and setting

contacts."
Paul: "It isn't that simple. We need to set up relationships. Let's have a
strategy."
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There seemed to be a vast difference in approaches and expectations between Ed
and Paul. Even the meanings of words were different for them. The order of 100 is what
Paul considered mature. But the founder-owner said that this is not that kind of maturity,
although it was not clear what the different levels of maturity were. There were tacit
expectations, views and ways of doing things that were held by the founder-owner, which
did not appear to have been communicated to Paul who had been at SIC for six months. I
could see the look of confusion on Paul's face. He came from larger organizations with
explicit processes that dictated the various steps in product development.
Paul: "For consumables, I know there is some work going on. How is that going?
Are you comfortable about the consumables?"
Ed: "No, that's a big challenge. We can't throw it into [Vice president of
Manufacturing's] department. There is a month or two of work required to do."
In this project, there were four components: electronics, firmware, mechanical,
and consumables. The electronics and firmware were apparently under the vice president
of Engineering, but the mechanical and consumable were under the founder-owner.
There did not appear to be a concerted effort. This might be because there was no overall
project coordination between these individuals or perhaps everyone was focused on
figuring out his own piece. It could also be because the founder-owner was involved and
was directing a large portion of the effort on this project (mechanical and consumables),
which made the situation complicated.

In November, Mark, the mechanical engineer who had worked on the mechanical
design, had gone through a number of design reviews on the Model-Q. However, now
the founder-owner had also started to incorporate some design changes in areas where he
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had seen weaknesses. People did not understand his motivations, but they were reluctant
to ask him. They were not sure why he was the one heading the project. People were
confused. One individual's comment describes some of the feelings: "Ed was secondguessing his engineers." When asked why he thought that was the case, he replied, "He
is just not aware of it." There was uncertainty about what was going on and some had
difficulty interpreting Ed's behavior. But no one dared to ask. It was difficult to
understand why there was no one else to go to for answers, such as the CEO. It appeared
that the tacit process that the founder-owner was following was not clear to anyone else.
Furthermore, the fact that he was the founder-owner seemed to make it difficult for
people to find out.
In the first week of December, another design review was called. This time, the
design review was on a new implementation of the machine, which was done by the
founder-owner. This was a different way of implementing the same idea. One individual
explained it this way: "This design review is a shoot out [between the older version and
this new version]. This isn't a public company so he [the owner] gets to have the final
say." Another individual said, "It's the owner versus Mark [the mechanical engineer who
designed the prototype]. If I had to bet my money, I know who I'll bet on for a winning
design."
However, during the design review, the old design was also discussed and some
problems that were being worked on were debated. There was much back and forth

discussion on these problems and it seemed like everyone participated. There appeared
two common themes: (1) let's make a logical decision based on data and (2) let's do a
low risk design to get units into production fast. The first theme required further study,
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while the second implied that they didn't have the time to do any more study. Each
theme sounded logical, but they were contradictory and therefore the cause of debates.
The subject turned to design for manufacturability, which is a function that
incorporates design features into a machine during the development phase to make it
more manufacturable.
John (manufacturing engineer): "Where do we fit DFM [design for
manufacturability] ?"
Mark (mechanical engineer): "The more cooks you have to make soup, the longer
it takes."
Ed (founder-owner): "We are trying to still understand if the concepts of what we
are doing work. I don't think we know the validity of the design enough to do design for
manufacturability." It seems that his previous message was lost. Clearly, he was saying
that this was still the research phase.
Bob (engineer): "Where do we do this in the process?"
CEO: "At the moment we are trying to do proof of fundamentals of design."
John: "OK. It's important to acknowledge that we are not doing DFM [design for
manufacturability]."
Ed: "I don't buy this that we are not doing DFM [design for manufacturability].
There is DFM [design for manufacturability] for two, for 20, etc. We get some of the
obvious ones before we build this."
John: "We have 20 screws in a tiny little subassembly."
Ed: "So we'll remove some of the screws."
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Bob: "I guess we don't want to be too extreme and say we need design for
manufacturability for this rev of the design."
CEO: "I sure would like to see two models that work."
What the CEO called proof of fundamentals was probably the same as proof of
concept. This meant giving physical shape to the mental idea to see if the model could
perform as envisioned. One unintended lesson was that not everyone saw the line
between Research and Development the same way. For example, John wanted to do
design for manufacturability in this stage, which the CEO called the "proof of
fundamentals," while Ed said that different levels of design for manufacturability could
be done, depending on where things were. So this line between research and
development was not just blurred, but was defined differently by different people.
Secondly, John was concerned that if he didn't push for design for
manufacturability now, he would never be able to get it. From their experience, once a
product was built, even in quantities of one or two, there would not be another
opportunity to change the design and the prototype would end up in Manufacturing.
Design for manufacturability was an internal need and it was likely to be secondary to
external needs.
The message that this was just a proof of concept was either not heard or ignored.
Even those who acknowledged this was proof of concept were confused about what was
going on, which stage the project was in, why the design reviews were conducted, and
what was the logic behind it all. This confusion created a certain uncertainty and
discomfort about the whole project.
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In order to understand this uncertainty, we need to understand this concept of
design review. "A formal design review constitutes a coordinated activity (including a
meeting or series of meetings) directed to satisfy the interests of the design engineer and
the technical discipline support areas (reliability, maintainability, human factors,
logistics, manufacturing, industrial design, quality assurance, and program management).
The purpose of the design review is to formally and logically cover the proposed design
from the total system standpoint in the most effective and economical manner through a
combined integrated review effort" (Blanchard and Fabrycky 1998:71).
A formal design review serves a number of purposes. It provides a formalized
check of the design with respect to specification requirements. It also provides a
common baseline for all project personnel by allowing the design engineers to explain the
reasons behind their approach to representatives from various departments. It addresses
interfaces to ensure that all system elements will be compatible. It provides a formalized
record of what design decisions were made and allows others the opportunity to identify
new ideas that might result in a simplified and cost effective product (Blanchard and
Fabrycky 1998:71-72). At SIC, there were no specification requirements to check the
design against and no record of design decisions was maintained. Nothing was written
down that could be seen or called a system document that would allow others to
understand what the machine should be expected to do. Instead, the engineer simply
showed the mechanical drawings on his laptop. To really be able to understand what this

design needed to achieve and have a design review of it would have required
specifications against which the mechanical design could have been compared.
However, these meetings did provide an opportunity for the designer to explain the
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reasons behind his approach and some opportunity for others to provide ideas for a better
approach. To call these design reviews confused people who defined them in other ways.
The discussions that occurred reflected this confusion.
Having said this, it is possible that this was what a design review at SIC was
about. They were simplified versions of a formal design review where a discussion of
what the designer had done took place. The meaning of a design review might very well
be different in the context of a product development where the research and development
phases were so intertwined.
In one of these design review meetings, the founder-owner said, "I was an
advocate of the previous design until about one and a half weeks ago." He described the
problem that he saw with that design and the fundamental difference between his design
and the old one. He showed a mockup, which opened the door for discussing other
concepts. He then said, "As the market evolves we might have to come up with a
different design." The atmosphere and rules changed from those of a design review to a
brainstorming session. Now there were three separate conversations in the room. At the
end of this session, no decisions were made, nor was anything documented.
The work of implementing a new version of Model-Q had begun. The founderowner worked with, Dick and Joe, two junior people in Engineering, designing models of
the parts that needed to go into this new machine. What the founder-owner was doing
was putting together a design to test this new concept. He was also directing the effort.
The more junior person, Joe, was making models on the computer and putting together
the mechanical drawing of the machine as he was told by the founder-owner. The other,
Dick, who was more experienced, was also working on making these models.
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Joe: "Dick, I've made changes to the plate."
Dick: "I'm also working on the same thing. It makes it really tough when you go
around modifying these parts. Now it messes me up."
Joe: "I think Ed had some vendors and just wanted to show them what was going
on."
Dick: "This probably won't work. Now we have two designs that don't agree.
I'm not beating up on you. You are wrong, way too much. As a designer, this is
one thing you want to avoid."
Joe was not really a designer. He is the youngest member of the engineering team
without any engineering background.
Dick: "For example, why did you do this like this?"
Joe: "I don't know. I just did what Ed told me."
Dick: "Wrong answer. Fundamentally, there is a problem with the design and if
you see it, you should bring it up."
Joe: "I just did what I was told. That's why he likes me."
Dick: "There is a culture here that's top down driven. It's based on gut feel.
Typically, the guy who does the model also puts it together, so we need to be sure
that it works. If I see a problem, I point it out to him. So, Armineh, impartial
observer, what do you think?"
Armineh: "I just want to know how you guys do things or get things done."
Dick: "We just talk to each other, that's how."
Armineh: "Is there a pattern to the way you talk to each other?"
Dick: "No. It's disorganized."
Dick dug into Joe further for doing things the way he did them. He was harshly
critical of Joe who had done what he was told to do. Joe seemed to have had enough.
So, he got up and left. Somehow, this interaction doesn't look friendly any more.
Dick: "I am working on [the new version of Model-Q]. It's fortunate for me. It's
good to be wanted."
This interaction captured a social aspect of the interpretive process: People
behaved in ways that they perceived would put them in a favored position with those in
authority.
After another design review for one of the versions of Model-Q held in midDecember an individual made the following comment: "What's amazing is that we had a
spec change in the meeting from a lifespan of 10K [ten thousand] to 100K [one hundred
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thousand]. For what reason, I don't know. Ed decided that 10K [ten thousand] would
not do. So, it went to 100K [one hundred thousand]. This has significant ramifications.
But no one asked any questions."
What this individual was implying was that such a change would affect the design
and the price of the product. Therefore a change of specification that would have design
ramifications should be carried out only with justification, which would be appropriately
communicated so that people would understand it. The other matter that he brought up is
that "no one asked any questions." He included himself. This may have been because
the founder-owner was the one who made the change or perhaps people assumed that
since the founder-owner was the person who had the ideas about the product he was also
the person to specify it. Perhaps the founder-owner's tacit knowledge was shared among
the others in the meeting and they agreed with this change. Typically, engineers prefer to
'over design' rather than 'under design'. Perhaps the fact that he went up in the
specification of lifespan was considered a move in the right direction, without further
examination.
The design review started.
Ed: "The plan in the next couple of days is to structurally stiffen the [old design]
to see how we can structure it. We then build one [of the new design] to play with it.
Mark: "We can make two different bases, have the same tops, build two different
machines and see how it works."
Peter: "Is it easier to build it on a computer or physically?"
Mark: "You've got to build it. It's too complex for simulation."
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Dick: "Why not make the assumption that they both work. Then what would be
the criteria for the company to chose one over the other?"
CEO: "Cost, ease of manufacture, technical support, cost, etc."
The meeting finished suddenly. Everyone went away. There did not appear to be
a firm decision as to what would be done. There were no action items or minutes to
document what was said or done. However, the idea was to look at both designs (the
older and the newer) and see which one was a better alternative. Although the criteria for
selection were not clearly defined, the CEO casually suggested some.
At the end of December, I saw the founder-owner testing the original design of
Model-Q. He was concerned about the safety of the machine and was trying to
characterize the machine. He showed me the new design in the machine shop. The
machinist had cut the parts for the machine. Jim, the mechanical engineer, who had
recently learned how to weld, was going to weld the parts together. The founder-owner
was doing what he had said in the meetings, that is, trying to characterize the old design
and build a new design.
Armineh: "So you are pursuing both paths in parallel?"
Ed: "The idea is to get the [new design] built fast so that by the time Mark
finishes the [old design], if the new design works and runs well, we won't need to build
the [old design]. If it doesn't, we have the [old design] as a fall back position."
So, Ed was trying to simultaneously do a new design and characterize it so that
they could identify the best approach. He identified people in Engineering that he needed
and they worked with him as needed. Although the changes to the mechanical parts were
significant, the changes to the electronics and firmware were minimal at this point.
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The one thing that was apparent is that the founder-owner was not married to one
way of doing things and he liked to try different alternatives before he settled on
something he felt was right. Even though he appeared to have communicated this at
meetings, his message was still ambiguous. Perhaps what he was doing was based on a
tacit understanding of what he thought was the way to do things next, but this
understanding was not shared by others. Perhaps others didn't understand the purpose of
what was taking place. Perhaps they didn't want to say anything because he was the
founder-owner. Perhaps the fact that he was involved made people nervous. From
observations and conversations, the only thing that could describe the mood is confusion
and being unclear about the founder-owner's ultimate goal.
To capture who was working on what at this point sheds some light on how a
project spreads. Since most of the work was on the mechanical aspect of this project,
then this was to be the focus. Mark, who worked offsite, was working on the old design,
trying to address weaknesses that had been identified. Dick and Joe had been working
with the founder-owner to develop the new design. The machine shop was building the
new design and Jim was going to weld the parts together. These resources were being
used to pursue a parallel design path for developing the best approach to implement
Model-Q. This took up half the engineering resources, and the firmware and electronics
design had not yet been included. Since this work was still on the proof of concept, it
could have been considered to be the research phase of the project. A lack of visible

division between this phase and a development phase meant that these engineers could
also have worked on the development phase of whichever design was chosen, with the
exception of Mark who seemed to work only on proof of concept and building
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prototypes. This allowed a seamless transfer of knowledge between research and
development engineering. Generally, distinct activities are done in each phase that define
the phase, but at SIC these phases were invisible or were not seen the same way by
people; the research and development phases were blurred and sometimes took place at
the same time.
An eighth design review was held. I asked one individual what they thought
about these design reviews. He said, "They are not design reviews. They are design
discussions. For design reviews, we should get a package ahead of time to review and
prepare. There is nothing here... I am not sure what you think about what's going on
here, but these are not typical. I don't know that they are typical. Some good design
suggestions have come out, but this is not the way to conduct design reviews." I asked if
there was a pattern to these design discussions. He replied, "If you see one, let me
know."
The Model-Q project was in between research and development phases; it was
neither research nor development. As discussed previously, the meaning of a design
review at SIC may be different than a formal design review outside of SIC. Model-Q
was not at a stage where formal design reviews could be carried out. What was carried
out in the name of design reviews were design discussions or brainstorming, which
allowed those interested to come together and discuss what was going on. So naming
these meetings design reviews carried a different type of expectation, which was partly
the reason for the confusion, conflict, and tension that developed at them. Those
attending had different ideas of why they had come and what the outcome should have
been.
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Different people from different backgrounds attended these meetings. Some had
formal engineering training, some had worked in larger organizations, some had been
exposed to how things were done at SIC for a long time, and some were new. There were
people from different technical backgrounds, different positions at SIC, and different
functional groups. They all interpreted their experiences at these meetings differently.
I had been away from SIC for a month. I walked in wondering if anything had
changed. The first thing I was told was that there was going to be a 10:00 o'clock
Model-Q meeting and that I should not miss it. I had this mental image that this would
be taking place in the large meeting room, much like the other meetings, but I soon
discovered that was not the case. I noticed everyone had gathered for the meeting in
Engineering around the desk of the vice president of Engineering. Paul sat behind his
desk, while the director of product marketing, Mary, sat on the other side. Everyone else
gathered around. This included the manufacturing engineer, engineers, industrial
designer, and the founder-owner. Mary had a printout in her hand, which she went over.
This was done at 10:00 a.m. every day and appeared like a new ritual headed by
Mary. The discussions were on the status of everyone's work. It was done very quickly.
Issues were raised, people were designated to work on specific problems, and a list was
written up with people's names on a piece of paper. People were tied to specific tasks
and there was a paper trail to reflect what people were tasked to do and their progress.
Questions such as "at what point are you going to be ready to test this?" were asked. It
seemed like she was moving people along towards the next stage of what needed to
happen on the project. If an issue came up, everyone got to put in his or her input.
Decisions were written down. Everyone knew who was responsible for what. Everyone
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had to talk about what they were doing and why. Mary made a list of what was discussed
and distributed it to everyone. It seemed like "everyone was on the same page."
This meeting took approximately twenty minutes. Everyone seemed content
during the meeting. The difference between this and other meetings was that the meeting
was documented and the notes distributed. When asked about why she held the meetings
this way, Mary said that she had tried different ways to get status from everyone, but
none of those worked well, "So, I decided we'll do it like this where everyone gets
together and talks about issues that affect everyone cross-functionally. So far, it seems to
be working." It seemed that she had started what might be her contribution to a process of
communications at SIC. What she had done was, at least on a project level, "broken
down the silos."
After the meeting, one individual commented that the thinking was to go with the
new design of Model-Q, that is, the founder-owner's design. "It just came together a
couple of days ago. It hasn't been tested or even proved to work. It's a real prototype
phase and it would be ridiculous to actually manufacture it because it isn't
manufacturable." When asked why one design was being chosen over the other, he
replied, "There was no technical reason given. Mark addressed all the technical issues
[of the older design]. He has a bill of materials to go and order from to start building the
[older] version. But Ed said no. We live under a monarchy here. He wants to do the
[new version], which isn't ready yet. The [original design] is one of the most design
reviewed products in this company."
Another individual who was asked which model would be shipped responded "Ed
decided that the [new design] would be the one. It was his edict.. .We haven't yet tested
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it. It doesn't have the electronics and software on it yet." Another commented,
"Engineers don't have any confidence in this design," meaning the founder-owner's
design.
The founder-owner showed me the prototype of this new design. He said, "We
tested it manually. It did some things well, but when we tried it again, it didn't perform
well. But this was all rough and manually done by churning up the power supply. It
didn't have any real electronics and software in it. We'll have to test it this weekend."
These conversations reveal, at a minimum, a lack of communications concerning
what the founder-owner was doing and wanting to achieve and the rest of the
organization. From my previous conversation with the founder-owner, what he appeared
to be looking for was a better alternative to the original design. If this alternative did not
work, then the original design would be the backup design. The founder-owner
acknowledged that the new design had only been out for a couple of days, and that it was
not likely that sufficient testing had been done on it to make such a decision. However,
some people seemed to think that the new version would be used. What the founderowner said was different from what others were saying.
Another issue was the lack of a clear divide between research and development.
While some believed that the original model was ready for manufacturing, it was still in
the proof of concept phase according to the founder-owner. So, both models were in
essence prototypes; the original model was an older and better-tested prototype, even if it
was not the ideal implementation.
In February, there was another new design of Model-Q in progress. One
individual commented, "We have all these different approaches, but no clear direction."
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Another said, "People just can't keep the same sense of urgency. People are stressed.
They are sick of being asked to work weekends. Because nobody believes in the design,
they think what they are doing is futile."
hi mid-March, it seemed that all other approaches were abandoned and the
original design for Model-Q was pursued. The founder-owner had started making
changes to the original design. It seemed as if this was the end of the research phase and
the beginning of the development phase of the original design. However, once again, this
effort was interpreted in such a way that surprised, confused, and made people anxious.
However, the choice to use the original model refuted the assumption that if the founderowner was coming up with a different design, then that was ultimately the design he was
going to choose.
Some were wondering why the founder-owner was making these changes to the
original design. The original design had gone to a show earlier in the month and had
been very well received. One of the individuals put it this way: "Inside, it's unbelievable
chaos. Outside, an incredible success story." This might have been reflective of the
priority SIC placed on external concerns over internal ones.
When asked why they thought the founder-owner was making changes to the
original model, someone said, "He hasn't been comfortable with the [original design]
concept.. .He is obsessed with the safety issue." Another said, "The behavior of the CEO
is disappointing. I believe the CEO has a good understanding of what's going on, but he
doesn't redirect things. He made a public statement that he is temporarily turning the
CEO reins over to the CFO so he can design another machine version himself. Now he is
designing another machine. This is like science fiction. I've never seen this happen

94

before.. .It must be terrible for morale. This must be a sinking feeling." A third person
said, "People like the vice president of Engineering were brought in to change things.
But no one can stop it." A fourth person said, "[the CEO] is getting involved in all sorts
of things. His title should be 'Anything but CEO'."
In May, the founder-owner said, "We've modified [the original] design. Hoping
to build 50" I noticed that almost everyone in Engineering was working on Model-Q. I
also found out that the vice president of Engineering was leaving in a couple of weeks.
Another individual outside of Engineering said, "Ed doesn't believe in
management or communication. He says people should just go do their work and they
don't need to be managed." An organizational psychologist was hired to come in to
define and create a role for the head of Engineering position.
Jim, the mechanical engineer, who had taken on the role of developing the
[original] Model-Q, said, "It's fun. But it's crazy. We keep making changes, beefing it
up, making things better so that they don't break, making them more manufacturable."
Although there was no clear division between research and development, research was
halted, albeit temporarily, and the development phase had begun. This was not visible to
the others who were in the midst of all the pressures to complete this work.
At this stage the final development changes were being made to build more
Model-Qs to ship to customers. As the founder-owner had previously said, it would be
for the purpose of getting their feedback.
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Model-0 summary
The founder-owner started model-Q, much like other projects. The prototype that
was taken to the trade show was received very well and provided some ideas for
improvement.
One of the high level employees at SIC had this to say about process: "This is a
mature company. Product development process is not clearly defined. It is in the heads
of people. There is an informal methodology in place. We are 120 people. What if we
became [a] $100 million company? How would we be today? We would then need to
teach and educate people what our process is. Structurally, we are informal. The
philosophy at the top is that we want to remain entrepreneurial, fast, helping customers,
and meeting customer expectations. This principle is doing things fast, there is a lot of
ramifications. Fast means we are not perfect." He added, "We are struggling with
execution. Why? Because we lack effective decision-making. We don't have a
behavioral framework that all employees understand.. .Another reason is clarity around
accountability. Why would a senior executive not have the authority to make decisions?
So we flounder and all decisions get pushed out. People are not empowered to make
decisions." At SIC there were many different vice presidents, but the perception of those
I spoke to is that they did not have the authority to act without consulting the CEO or the
founder-owner. Here the organic entrepreneurial image of SIC contrasted with this more
hierarchical decision-making process.
There were no consistent rules to follow. Although an organizational chart
existed, it was confidential and was not displayed anywhere. There were no mission
statements or quality statements displayed anywhere.
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It appears that the interpretive approach is the primary process that was used by
those involved in this project to determine possibilities for the next step. Different
backgrounds, expertises, focus areas, and interests guided the interpretation of people's
experience, and therefore, what they thought the next step should be. So, a diversity of
people generates different ideas about the development process. It is the combination of
these ideas that leads to the construction of a PDP. Therefore, one of the positive aspects
of the interpretive approach is that it allows the participation of people from different
perspectives to contribute to how things are done. However, without an awareness of the
nature of the process, people's different perspectives can conflict, leading to
misunderstanding and confusion.
In this project, the founder-owner, who had a different background, experience,
and expertise from the others, was by default the primary guide of the process. Although
he was explicit about what he wanted to do, it wasn't heard or understood by others who
did not share his experience. This is perhaps because others interpreted this approach in a
way that did not fit their experiences and so it was meaningless for them. It appears that
people working in such environments may need a set of non-technical skills to evaluate
what is going on and act effectively.
Figure 8 summarized the process that the project followed. It seems that there
was a separate research phase followed by a development phase. It is not clear what will
come next, but considering what the founder-owner has said, the product would be put in
the hands of customers for feedback. If this project follows the same pattern as Model-S,
the next stage might be incorporation of customer feedback.
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Model-Q consumable
The consumables for Model-Q were developed as described below by one of the
designers: "[The owner] came up with an idea, then he sat and talked to us about it. He
then made some samples to see what was possible. We all made some samples. We
patented all the different thoughts that [the owner] had. Then did a series of
experimentation with them and documented what we learned. We then went with what
was the best approach." After the best approach was decided, research was done into the
materials and other requirements, and then recommendations were made to
manufacturing.
The Model-Q consumables had been developed, but were still being improved.
Manufacturing the consumables was yet another project. Different ways of
manufacturing these consumables were being experimented with in the Industrial Design
area under the directions of the founder-owner. Prototypes of different manufacturing
concepts for Model-Q consumables were developed and tested. The most feasible
version was to be presented to Manufacturing, which would then adopt a means of
producing these consumables in volumes. However, Manufacturing did not have the
necessary equipment to manufacture these consumables yet and was not involved in
producing any of the Model-Q consumable prototypes. Figure 9 shows the process that
Model-Q consumables appear to have followed.
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After observing Model-S, Model-7, and Model-Q I began to see that the
organizational chart for Engineering was more complicated that I had previously assumed
and so was the role of the vice president of Engineering. At the time that these two
projects were taking place, there were other active projects in Engineering, which
required different functional areas, one of which was called continuation engineering.
The engineering test/design verification test area and technical services areas also
reported to the head of Engineering. An organizational chart of Engineering is shown in
Figure 10.
Paul
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(senior engineer)
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Figure 10 - Engineering Organizational Chart
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The position of the vice president, director, or manager of Engineering is a
difficult one for an organization such as SIC. First, there appeared to be many different
areas that a person in this position would need to lead both administratively as well as
technically. These included research, prototype building, development, sustaining,
engineering test/design verification test, and technical support. Second, the founderowner participated in product development, often as a technical lead and directed
engineering activities. This made for a complex situation in an environment where a
blurring of functions and responsibilities was perceived to be the way things get done.
Third, the CEO also got involved and directed engineers. This made an already complex
situation even more complex.
There was general consensus that the founder-owner decided what projects would
be worked on in Engineering and that the CEO often directed engineers, without
consulting the vice president of Engineering. This was frowned upon by the engineers
and by various department heads and was considered to undermine the authority of the
hired management. An individual in Engineering said, "Ed [the owner] just comes in
here and tells people to stop working on what they are working on and do something
else." The absence of a job definition for the founder-owner created some issues. An
engineer voiced a common sentiment: "One thing that's been driving people crazy is the
CEO getting involved in Engineering.. .1 think that's wrong.. .is disrespectful, is sticking
his nose in engineering to solve day-to-day problems." When asked why he thought the
CEO did this, he responded, "What he does is create noise from information. It's not
productive." He added, "He is business minded. Ed [the owner] enjoys the process of
developing products and delivering a service. He doesn't think about business. It's more
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emotional for him." Although the blurred responsibilities and blurred functional lines
were common occurrences at SIC, it seemed that in this case, there was an implicit
understanding that this was wrong, particularly for the CEO.
Auto-consumable
History of Auto-consumable
One of the on-going consumable projects that had started three years ago was a
special consumable that allowed automatic feeding into a machine. This was an important
project because it helped SIC sell consumables in high volumes. This was being
developed for a customer who was developing a machine that would use these
consumables and which had very stringent reliability specifications
The engineer who was working on this project said the project started because
"[the owner] had been thinking about doing this for a long time. He came up with the
idea. We got our ideas together and applied for a patent on it. So, we developed it [the
consumable] and sent it to them [the customer] to test it. We needed them to test the
product because we didn't have a machine. [You can manually work with it to see how it
would work]. So we did limited testing here. While we were developing [this], they [the
customer] were developing the machine. So when they got the machine developed, we
got one [a machine]. So we now test using their machine. I developed the consumable
and the machine that [makes this consumable at SIC]." He described the process of
development further. "We would make some changes and send it back to them [the
customer]. They would do some testing and give us feedback. We finally have it reliable
now and tested their machine with our consumable and it's very successful."
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Furthermore, the machine, which he had designed to make this consumable, was for low
volume production, but now a new machine was needed to mass-produce them.
So, in this case, the customer was the one who was developing the machine that
would use these consumables. Nevertheless, this process also required a synergistic
relationship where feedback was received on the product (in this case consumables) that
allowed SIC to carry out development according to the customer's requirements. This
process of getting feedback from the customer on the consumables appears to be similar
to that used for getting feedback on the machines. In this case, they could not do further
development without feedback from the customer.
Auto-consumable during fieldwork
When this research began, the product had satisfied the customer's requirements
and low volume shipments had started. One person, who was from manufacturing, was
trained by the engineer on how to use the low volume manufacturing machine to make
the consumable, and how to do quality checks and package the product for shipping to
the customer. This part appeared to be totally under the direction of the engineer in
Engineering, as opposed to Manufacturing.
Auto-consumable summary
Figure 11 shows the process that auto-consumable appears to have gone through.
Like other products so far discussed, this product was also started by the founder-owner.
The development phase appears to have included research and development in an
intertwined fashion where the two phases seem blurred, much like Model-S. The
development and building of low volume manufacturing equipment also took place in
Engineering. Even when shipping the product to a customer, Manufacturing did not
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seem involved, with the exception of providing an individual to do the work under the
directions of the engineer in charge of the project. Therefore, research, development, and
manufacturing phases all occurred in Engineering. In this case, besides the product
development, the manufacturing equipment was also developed and built in Engineering.
The development process included the feedback from the customer, who was in
the process of developing the equipment needed to work with this auto-consumable. The
feedback was used to further develop the auto-consumable, so that eventually the autoconsumable was fine-tuned to the customer's machine and met the customer's
specification for reliability. So, the process was similar to the Model-S machine process
in that feedback was used to make adjustments to meet customer requirements.
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CHAPTER 6: NEW PROJECTS
New projects include projects that began after this fieldwork. Table 4 shows the
list of the projects in this category.
Table 4 - Projects in the New Projects Category

Machines
Consumables

New Projects
Model-B
Special orders
Model-Q-N

Model-B machine
One of the projects that started at SIC during this research was Model-B. This
was a machine that incorporated the functions of Model-S and Model-7 in one. The
project required mechanical, electronics, and firmware engineers and an industrial
designer. It was intended to replace the Model-S and Model-7 pair. The engineer who
was working on it explained that a new implementation of the function of Model-S had
been developed and the idea was to join this new implementation and a modified Model1 into one machine.
The theme throughout this project was a constant anxiety about what the
expectations were. Was this something that was going to be shipped to the customer or
was this a proof of the concept model only? The reason for this anxiety was the notion
that as soon as a 'breadboard' was completed and tested, it might be shipped to the
customer. A 'breadboard' is not a finished product by any means, but a rough model that
is built to show that it can be done. In other words, it is a proof of concept model. It
seemed that this fear was based on what was experienced with the Model-S.
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Another question was how many prototypes could be made in the two weeks that
they had allowed themselves. Model-B was a product that the founder-owner wanted to
build and Engineering had agreed to come up with a prototype. Working on two
prototypes was complicated because each machine required parts that were hand made
and probably not fully documented, which meant that the engineers making the prototype
had to do more work in an already shortened schedule. The other complication was that
the parts were being designed and tested as the product was put together; design and
testing was merged with research. There was a feeling of uncertainty as to why this
project was being done and what its future was. This uncertainty bothered the engineers
because the decisions they made depended on how Model-B was going to be used. If it
was just a proof of concept for developing a prototype, then they could do what was
needed to get the prototype done. But if it was to develop a machine, then more than two
weeks were needed and the approach to development needed to be agreed on. hi other
words, how they interpreted their next steps depended on what their experiences told
them was appropriate for the phase or purpose of the project, since there were no rules to
follow. To add to the ambiguity, one of the key mechanical engineers was already
working on another project that needed to be released to Manufacturing.
In this project, numerous and frequent meetings were held. During the kick-off
meeting, one of the team members said, "A lot of coordination would be needed between
people [in the team] and three brains have to coordinate." Another said, "I'm worried

about coordination between people and I don't see how it's going to happen." The speed
and the quantity of work in the project was one of the factors that made coordination a
concern for all involved. The other factor was the project's unclear status. The decision

was thus made to have frequent meetings. The perception was that there was much to do,
pieces of the system needed to be designed independently, coupling between pieces
needed to be completed, and when all was put together, it had to fit, so that they could do
integration.
One of the uncertainties that contributed to the low morale is expressed by an
engineer's experience on a past project: "This was one of the most important projects in
the company and it is now totally forgotten after it was finished. People are worried that
Model-B would go the same way." He is referring to a prototype of another machine that
was taken to a trade show after much work, but a decision was made to discontinue work
because of lack of interest by potential customers.
Despite unanswered questions about the customers for Model-B, there was a real
sense of urgency to get it done in two weeks. Technical discussions on key issues, such
as whether one or two controllers should be used, were decided without much analysis.
Each person was in charge of his own piece of the project, which was not really
discussed, questioned, or scrutinized by others. The overall project plan was really
defined by the two-week time frame that they had to complete the project. The
interfacing between individuals and units was done to accommodate each other, and not
to fully discuss optimal design choices. Each person only had control over his own part
and interfacing between these parts was done to bring the whole product together. No
written document was mentioned as a specification for a part or for an interface.
Communication was by word of mouth and very fluid. It was not about designing an
optimum machine, but a quickly-built one.
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I observed people working in the lab on this machine. It literally looked like two
separate machines being put together. There were two power supply cords and
documentation was rudimentary. The mechanical engineer photographed the parts so that
if the product were shipped, he would have an idea of what the parts were and how they
were put together. This was what he had learned from working on Model-S where this
had happened to him. The electronics were in different pieces. It was not one integrated
printed circuit board, but different parts. Each person working on the project
independently contributed to the making of the machine. The likelihood of another one
being produced exactly the same way was low. It looked very much like a proof of
concept model.
All the team members and the vice president of Engineering attended the followup meetings where the engineers would talk about what each one was doing. They would
then adjust to meet each other's needs. The integration date had started slipping due to
the autonomy of the groups; it was not a formal decision.
Every meeting followed a similar pattern. First, immediate concerns were
addressed, i.e. what any individual needed to get done. Second, those who were affected
by any of the events that were taking place on the project would talk about them. This
allowed others to coordinate others' plans into their own ability to meet deadlines.
Individual team members would use reactions from others as feedback. Third,
adjustments by individuals would be made to accommodate to other engineers and the

deadline for integration would be adjusted if necessary. As Sam, the lead mechanical
engineer on this project, put it, "There are a lot of factors. There are requirements that
are constantly changing. It's hard to plan day to day. What we do needs to help others.
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You need to interact with others, need to be flexible, need to think of your part and your
part interacts with other people's. Lots of coordination." Thus the meetings were for
making adjustments and coordination to allow for productive interactions, under an
aggressive schedule, among all the different members of the team. This allowed a
number of people to work independently, yet as a team. It also seemed to provide a
degree of support and reduce anxiety. These discussions and schedule adjustments
provided support for individuals working feverishly to get their own parts done.
In one of the meetings, the tensions became high when the schedule slipped again.
One of the engineers said, "We are not working to requirements. We are working to a
deadline but we don't know the next step." Sam responded, "Next step is iteration of the
product by testing it." Sam had been at SIC for a long time. But then the question of
who was going to make another one or two, so that they could do more testing came up.
Was it Engineering or Manufacturing? Another engineer said, "When are we going to
see the big picture?" Yet another said, "The Model-1 should be redesigned for the final
product because it's old technology."
Only Sam seemed certain of what the next step was. He said that this machine
was being designed to sell consumables. If Model-1 were to be redesigned, they would
miss the market opportunity. Sam had worked on Model-S and was comfortable with
that process. He appeared to be looking at this project as taking the same route as ModelS.
The ambiguity of purpose was palpable in these meetings. No one seemed to
know the goal. How was it that this project had been started without even a common
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understanding of where they were going? There was much concern about the dead end
aspect of this project; perhaps all this work was going to go nowhere.
Although Sam thought of this as just another SIC project where a machine was
being designed to sell consumables, much the same way as Model-1 or Model-S, others
thought that there should be a separate group outside of Engineering that would do these
proof of concept projects. This is what Otto and Wood (2001) call the research phase.
The contrasting perceptions were clearly worlds apart. One person saw this as the way
machines are developed at SIC, while the other saw it as research and totally outside of
development engineering. It was not clear how this had happened. They debated
whether there would be further development on this machine or whether this was going to
be the final product. Sam called this engineering with the next step being manufacturing,
while another called this proof of concept with the next step being development. These
were very different ways of looking at what they were doing. It was not clear why there
were such different perceptions as to what was going on or even what phase the project
was in. The invisible or blurred line between what looked like research and what looked
like development appeared to be the cause of these conflicting views. At SIC, these two
phases could be intertwined, as in Model-S, or separate, as in Model-7.
There did not appear to be a plan known to this level or it was too ambiguous to
understand. There was unease about the ambiguity, but some people were more
concerned about it than others. The perception that things were being done haphazardly
and without planning troubled them. One of the engineers lamented, "If you don't
believe in the product you are building, how can you get up and come to work everyday
to kick ass." This obviously had an effect on the morale.
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After a one week and two day slip, they started characterizing the machine. I
attended another meeting at this time. The mood had changed. The team members were
much more relaxed and were joking around. They were in a much better mood than in
previous days. Their immediate task was to continue testing and tweaking. They decided
that the next step was to alert the engineering test department that the unit was coming
their way for testing. However, the discussion went back to concerns about what the next
step would be. One of the main concerns was that the product contained the "guts" of
Model-1, which required much tweaking. Someone commented that there was "a lot of
voodoo" and that a clean design would save the company money. Another person asked
what features needed to be demonstrated. There were no clear answers to these
questions.
In the next few days, everyone continued tweaking the firmware, mechanicals,
and the electronics. As one of the team members commented, "We have a great team.
They take things seriously and are very responsive." I asked, Sam, the mechanical
engineer who worked on the project, what kept him at SIC. He just pointed to Model-B
and said "this." He explained the design of the machine, showed me his lab book, and
talked about how he built some of the parts in the machine shop. I saw the pride with
which he talked about the technology and what Model-B could do. As an engineer
myself, those feelings resonated with me.
However, the project took an unexpected turn. When I asked one of the team
members what was going on with Model-B, he replied, "Nothing at the moment. It's just
sitting there. We are busy on things that will make the company money soon. There are
things that have gone into production, Model-S and Model-7. So no one is working on
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Model-B at the moment." I asked another team member what happened at their last
Model-B meeting. "We didn't really get anywhere. There was conflict between what the
team thinks the product should be.. .Some [team members] think that we shouldn't be
putting an old Model-1 into this Model-B because it's old technology and that we should
redesign what we have to come up with a better product. But this will take a long time.
Ed wants to develop something where we can keep our foot in the door with [the
customer]. A quick turn around thing. A six month project. After that, we can then
build a machine that's got the modern processor.. .But for now, we need to get the
product out so that we don't lose the customer." Another engineer said that the direction
should come from the founder-owner and the CEO, and that Paul, the vice president of
Engineering, was going to meet with them to find out. I looked at the area of the
prototype. There was no activity. It was hard to believe that all the frantic activity had
come to a sudden halt. People had been redirected to tasks required to release a product
that needed to be shipped. But this was the way it had to be. For the Model-S and
Model-7 to be started in manufacturing, a degree of engineering involvement was needed,
as described previously.
The comment that was made about redesigning Model-1 with a new processor
was something that some in Engineering were discussing. The processor in Model-1 was
going to become more and more difficult to obtain. This was one of the main reasons for
the push to do this. The other was that Model-1 was considered an old technology that
was never designed to be manufacturable. These conversations reminded me of what I
had heard about Model-2.
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During the rest of the fieldwork, Model-B was put on hold. It was never restarted,
because after Model-S and Model-7 were shipped, Model-Q became the new priority and
consumed all the resources.
Model-B summary
The founder-owner started model-B much like the other products. The process
described above, if continued, might have ended up like Model-S. According to Sam, it
seemed that the founder-owner wanted to take this product in the same direction as
Model-S, but for some reason, this was not being communicated.
The way the product came together was that each person worked separately,
based on how they interpreted what needed to be done based on their own expertise and
experiences. So, at a technical level, individuals worked on their own pieces without
much technical discussion with the others. However, the coordination needed for
integration of these different pieces was done at a team level in these frequent meetings.
The team members were accommodating and cooperative. Project slips were justified in
a way that did not point to any one person. The focus was on individual adjustments and
creating an impression of cooperation. So, even though the technical aspect was
performed independently, the overall coordination of the project was team oriented.
The skills seen here were more than just technical; they included the ability to
work as a team, interact with others in a productive way in a stressful environment, and
be flexible to deal with changing and ambiguous needs and events. There were some in
the team that had a problem with this type of environment, but there were those like Sam,
who thrived. However, everyone got his or her part of the job done.
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The case of Model-B demonstrates the ambiguity and multiple perspectives that
can underlie a seemingly holistic process like PDP. Those like Sam, who had been
through a project such as Model-S, had different ideas of what was next compared to
those who had not been at the company or had not been involved in Model-S. There
were different views on what was next and what should be next. These different views
came from individual interpretation of the project.
Special order consumables
Special order samples of consumables were made for the sales people or
customers who had special requests. The person in charge of making these consumables,
Anne, put together attractive samples either for SIC's sales people to show customers or
for customers with special requests. She spoke to the customers who provided their
requirements and she searched for materials that would meet them as much as possible.
She then built trial samples by hand for the customer and awaited feedback. Once the
customer requirements were fulfilled, Manufacturing produced the required orders in
large volumes.
Model-Q-N consumables
Another new consumable was evolving from the consumable for Model-Q. The
idea was conceived by the founder-owner and developed in the industrial design group.
It was patented and was ready to be shown at a trade show. The designer shipped these
to the founder-owner at the trade show and it was expected that the feedback from the

show would determine the fate of this product So after a week, based on the feedback
from the trade show, it was decided that changes were needed. A few weeks later, I saw
a number of different versions of this particular consumable. The product had evolved to
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incorporate the feedback from the trade show. Figure 12 shows the process that ModelQ-N consumables appear to have followed.
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Owner has idea
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He works with
Industrial Design
to implement
different concepts

They apply
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Figure 12 - Model-Q-N Consumable Development Elements
Consumables summary

The consumables are the profit makers for SIC. There appear to have been
changes in the way consumables were developed in the past two or three years. Some
engineers told me that Engineering used to develop and test the consumables, but now
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this development took place in Manufacturing. However, from my observations, there
are more people involved in the process of developing the consumables than just
manufacturing. It seems that people in manufacturing engineering work on the
development phase after the founder-owner and the industrial design group have had a
chance to carry out the research phase and to generate recommendations. So the research
and development phase are separate for consumables. Figure 13 shows the various
phases of consumables development and the functional groups involved at each phase.
The consumables are also put through the process of getting feedback from either
trade shows or customers and changes are made to the product to incorporate this
feedback.
One individual, outside of Industrial Design, described the process for developing
consumables as follows: "[The owner] comes up with the ideas and he tests his ideas and
gives it to Manufacturing. It's a manufacturing engineering kind of process, not a design
engineering one.. .You just have to refine the manufacturing process by trying different
settings on the [manufacturing machine]." Another individual said, "Basically, we go
from design, what we want to do, to manufacturing, what we can do." There appears to
be an agreement as to how things are done for consumables, that is, the process that the
idea goes through to become a shippable product.
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It seems that although consumables are technically sophisticated, they are
relatively simple compared to machines. There are many disciplines involved in the
development of machines (mechanical, electronics, and firmware engineers, industrial
designers, and manufacturing engineers) and their development takes more resources and
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time. It takes many parts and steps to design and develop a machine, whereas it takes
relatively fewer materials to develop consumables. The development of consumables is
more of a manufacturing process, whereas the development of machines is an
engineering process.
Another difference is that consumables appear to have a distinct research and
development phase. The founder-owner and the industrial design group do the research
phase for consumables, while manufacturing engineering does the development phase.
For machines these phases are intertwined, and include the founder-owner and the
resources available in Engineering working to carry out research, development, and
manufacturing of the prototypes. This complicates things because research,
development, and manufacturing are different areas that require different sets of skills.
So perhaps the separation of the phases for consumables brings clarity to the task at hand.
Some of these factors contribute to the difference in the process of developing machines
and consumables. Another factor may have to do with the attitude of people who work in
Industrial Design and who shape the process for consumables. One of them said, "Smart
companies have an advantage as times change. They don't have a baggage of people,
way of doing things.. .They do things differently, that's what we do here a lot. You really
have to. We do planning and follow through, but kind of do it in a different way. It's
incredibly fluid."
We have seen that Engineering at SIC performs a number of functions

(continuation engineering, research, development, and manufacturing), making it a
company within a company; Engineering appears like a multi-functional organization that
performs product development and manufactures prototypes, without explicit rules. The

external focus of SIC brings the ambiguities of the outside world into the inside world of
this group called "Engineering." Although ambiguity is considered commonplace in the
research phase, it is not normally the theme in the development phase, much less during
manufacturing. At SIC, the intertwining of research and development spreads ambiguity
into the development phase.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION
This thesis has demonstrated that the need for interpretation is grounded in
ambiguity. There are two facets of this ambiguity: first, the content of any step required
in the transformation process, despite being thought of as clear by those involved, is not
fully specified. Second, the iterative nature of the transformation of ideas into products
leads to inputs passing repeatedly through the same functional "step." Therefore,
assigning actions to be taken upon an input is ambiguous and cannot be resolved simply
through a process of technical trouble shooting. So interpretation is done by people
interacting with each other, as multiple stakeholders try to make sense of what is going
on and what needs to be done; the challenges are as much social as they are technical.
An ideal product development process, as described in engineering literature, is a
specific sequence of prescribed phases, each defined by different functions. Resources
required to perform these functions are specified and the engineers performing them have
a clear idea of tasks and the sequence in which they need to be performed. This creates a
methodology that is generalized, prescriptive, rule-based, and rational. This is the black
box view of a product development process. It is "used by cyberneticians whenever a
piece of machinery or a set of commands is too complex. In its place they draw a little
black box about which they need to know nothing but its input and output" (Latour
1987:3). This is an outsider's view of a product development process that is similar to
Latour's "ready made science" (Latour 1987:4). The idealized product development
process is "ready made" engineering.
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After nine months of ethnographic data collection on different product
development projects at SIC, the process of transforming ideas into products appears
different than the ideal. Much like what Latour calls "science in the making" (Latour
1987:4), at SIC one sees engineering in the making. Looking at how products take shape
at SIC is looking into the black box before it's closed. One sees the complexity and the
mess, the ambiguity, the exploratory and incremental nature of engineering, and the
interpretive nature of engineering work during product development. What happens
cannot be put into clean boxes and labeled, with inputs and outputs nicely specified. The
tasks that engineers perform, before closing this black box, are not rule based, but
interpretive. Although some common functions can be inferred, these functions are not
clearly bounded, specified, or sequenced. The inputs and outputs are not clearly defined,
nor do all the products pass through the same set of functions. Because the tasks needed
to perform these functions are not prescribed, the product development process at SIC is
not generalized, prescriptive, or rule based. What happens is much more ambiguous.
The founder-owner performs what can be called the market research function. It
includes attending trade shows or talking to distributors and customers, and yields many
ideas for products. The development of these ideas is a complex process, which involves
knowledge of the market and of the history of the product area, a passion for the product,
and a constant search for niche market needs. In a conversation with the founder-owner,
Ed, about where ideas come from, he said, "When it comes to ideas, different products
have different events." By events, he appeared to mean circumstances. "Customers will
say we have some need, but I have to have an appreciation of it to see it. I love [SIC
products], so I always think of things related to [these products]. I have about 20
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different things going on. Some of them I have been working on for years. I wake up at
3:00 in the morning and I write down some ideas. I document them in this book with
places for witnesses to sign." This witness signature is for patent applications, because
he considers these ideas to be the intellectual property of his company. When asked if he
gets his ideas from customers or if he thinks about ideas and then a customer asks him for
something that matches with one of his ideas, he said, "It works both ways. Sometimes, I
look at a range of things and I think of a number of ideas that fit in different places.
Sometimes the customer asks for things and I come up with a way of solving the
problem."
Trade shows or customers sites are also where products can be tested. One of the
employees explained that Ed had gone to a trade show to demonstrate one of the
prototypes that had recently been developed and added, "Ed said to me that we wouldn't
have any products if we didn't have trade shows. We would keep working and going on
to improve things forever. Trade shows are a deadline and we have to do our best and
show it [SIC products that are in development] to get feedback." So, trade shows allow
Ed to get new ideas, show off new products, learn about the competitor or customer
needs, receive feedback on the product idea, and a timeline for product readiness. Trade
shows also determine if a product idea should become a product or if it should be
abandoned. For instance, an example of success at the show launched Model-Q as a
feasible product idea to pursue, whereas a lack of interest would have meant that it be
abandoned forever. Aside from trade shows, customers are also a source of product ideas
and a test site for SIC products. Problems reported by customers are corrected in the next
revision of the product. Customer feedback on features is used as valuable input to the

design of the product. SIC customers use SIC machines and consumables to provide a
service to their own customers. Based on their customer feedback and their own use of
the product, they provide valuable feedback to SIC on features, which are then
incorporated into the design. This collaborative effort incorporates end-customer needs
into SIC products; the boundary between company and customer is ambiguous.
Therefore, the market research function is an exploratory interaction between Ed
(SIC) and the outside world. This function is performed for different purposes and at
different times and may involve other functions. Market research may be performed for
an idea or for a product. It may involve Engineering or Industrial design. Its inputs and
outputs vary, the tasks required to perform it vary, and the resources required vary.
The proof of concept/research function generally involves Ed working with
Engineering or the Industrial Design group to develop a proof of concept model for his
ideas. This might lead to the development of a prototype by one of these two groups. A
prototype might either be sent to a customer or a trade show. An example of this was the
Model-Q machine, which was shown at a trade show and was received enthusiastically.
This prototype might then undergo further modification or development, based on
customer feedback, or might be abandoned if no interest is shown. This process merges
the proof of concept/research function with the market research function.
Customers who receive prototypes use them to sell new consumables, which blurs
the line between a prototype and a finished product. They communicate feedback on
how they use the product and the problems they see, among other messages. This
feedback is often incorporated into the next version of the prototype at SIC. With each
iteration, a certain degree of Design For Manufacturability is implemented, which is a
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task clearly outside the research function. This merges the proof of concept/research
function with the development function. An example of this is Model-S where twelve
versions of the prototype were developed over a period of two years. What determines an
acceptable output from this function is ambiguous.
So, the proof of concept/research function is not a concisely defined and limited
set of tasks that is performed and set aside. It is intertwined with the market research
and/or development functions. It is also performed iteratively, so it is performed at
different times and for different reasons during the transformation of ideas into products.
There is ambiguity as to where the inputs to this function might come from and where the
outputs might go. The beginning and end of this function are also ambiguous. The
engineers performing this function face much of this ambiguity and are constantly
interpreting in order to transform the inputs they receive to what they perceive to be the
required outputs. During this process, they might incorporate the history of the
prototype, the new feedback from the field, Ed's ideas or a perception of what Ed may
want, and resources available to them. Based on their own background and skills, they
interpret what all these mean to them and what they should do next. This interpretive
process is often a struggle.
The development function for machines is where "productization" is performed.
This includes tasks such as making a product more manufacturable. This is not
necessarily a separate function. The development can be intertwined with proof of
concept/research and/or market research, such as in Model-S, or done separately, as in
Model-7. For consumables, this function is performed in manufacturing engineering.
Prototypes of consumables built in Industrial Design are transferred to Manufacturing,
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where a process for the production of consumables is developed. The output from this
function can be used to perform market research or to enter the manufacturing function.
Therefore, much like the research function, the development function is an
iterative process, intertwined with other functions, with ambiguous inputs and outputs.
Similar to the proof of concept/research function, this ambiguity results in engineers
using the interpretive process to decide what they should do next.
Generally, the manufacturing function is not considered part of the product
development process, but at SIC, it is an integral part of how an idea is transformed into a
product within Engineering. Other such functions are continuation engineering and
technical support. At SIC, these functions consume a large number of engineering
resources, addressing problems on the production line or from the field.
The manufacturing function is just as ambiguous as the research and development
functions. It can take place in Engineering, Industrial Design, or Manufacturing. For
instance, 40 Model-S and Model-7 machines had been built by Engineering and shipped
to customers over a two-year period. In this case, the manufacturing function was
intertwined with proof of concept/research, development, and market research.
Engineers were manufacturing the machines that were shipped to customers.
Products are also manufactured in Manufacturing. What determines the release of
a product to be manufactured by Manufacturing is sometimes unclear. When handoff
between Engineering and Manufacturing takes place, the knowledge needed to make the

product is transferred between the two groups in a different way for each different
machine. Examples of this were observed for Model-7 and Model-S. In the case of
Model-7, people in Manufacturing knew its predecessor machine and they incorporated
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the necessary changes to manufacture a new model with relative ease. On the other hand,
for Model-S, this was a complicated and highly ambiguous task, and required much
interpretive work for Manufacturing and Engineering people involved. Therefore, even
the manufacturing function at SIC is interpretive work. Furthermore, the boundaries
between Manufacturing and Engineering are porous.
Unlike the idealized product development models addressed in engineering
literature, the product development process at SIC is not sequential, rule based,
prescriptive, or performed the same way for all products. Nor are any of the functions
performed in the process of development clearly defined or sub-divided into separate
tasks. Each function is a combination of other functions, a combination that can vary
according to product or other factors. Inputs and outputs to these functions are not
clearly specified and sometimes not predictable. The beginning or the end of these
functions and what determines them is based on different factors that are often tacit.
Thus the specific activities required to perform these functions are ambiguous. To
determine what should be done, the engineers involved in these transformational
activities are constantly interpreting to transform inputs into outputs, based on what the
specific situation means to them.
One factor that may drive this type of product development model is the new or
constantly-changing niche market that SIC products satisfy. This makes developing
products a risky business. The exploratory and incremental development approach
allows incremental investment in development, which can be discontinued at any time if
the market needs change or the product is not deemed viable. This minimizes risk, which
is important for any small company with limited resources. This approach to product

development has consequences for the way Engineering is organized and managed, for
the skills required by engineers who work in such an environment, and in general, for
engineering education.
Engineering at SIC encompasses many functions, which are ordinarily performed
by different groups in a company. These functions include market research, proof of
concept/research, development, prototype manufacturing, technical support, engineering
test/design verification test, document control, and continuation engineering. Different
skills and focus are needed to perform these varied functions. One consequence of this
type of organization is that it requires people with different skills who can perform in
more than one functional area. However, it is unusual for any engineer to comfortably
stretch over these functions in any depth.
Therefore, a broader and more generalized knowledge is required to be able to
function in this type of environment. The majority of engineers working at SIC did not
have a university degree in engineering, which likely allowed them a broader base of
knowledge needed to perform over such a range of functions. Another consequence of
this type of organization is the complexity that it brings to the management of
Engineering across this range of activities; the position of any Engineering manager is
made even more difficult by the undefined roles the founder-owner and even the CEO
play in running Engineering. This accounts for some of the misunderstandings among
those involved in product development. Since the position of the vice president of
engineering is currently open, the possibility for an alternative management structure in
Engineering could be explored.

This type of structure also blurs job responsibilities. This can be problematic,
particularly when the individuals include the CEO and the founder-owner. Their
participation in Engineering causes concern because different people interpret their
responsibilities differently. Sometimes they have conflicting ideas about product
development, which causes some confusion. On the other hand, it allows those from
outside of Engineering to contribute to product development in ways that might not have
otherwise been possible. One example of this was the product-marketing manager whose
mechanical engineering background allowed him to work on documenting design
changes and assembling Model-7. This task was outside of his official duties and outside
the Product-Marketing department.
Engineering is therefore not just a department in this organization. It is more like
a company located within a company and the boundary between these entities is
permeable. This merging of a variety of functions in engineering contrasts with the
official structure that one perceives initially, based on the various heads of departments.
This contradiction creates confusion and conflict. Therefore, the official structure of the
organization is inconsistent with its functioning.
One of the positive consequences of these merged functions under Engineering is
that it allows a seamless transfer of knowledge between different functions. This is
mostly because the work is done by the same people or by people sitting very close to
each other. On the other hand, it causes delays and stress.
Merging the market research function into engineering product development
brings a heavy external focus into Engineering. For instance, the management and
engineering work done for an exploratory function requires a different focus and skills
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than implementing a product that would be fit for Manufacturing. This adds complexity,
which, combined with the blurred functions and job responsibilities, causes much stress,
conflict, and various other problems. The question that arises here is how can one
manage work that may require a variety of functions, which are intertwined, but need
different skills and foci? This is a challenge that needs to be addressed in such an
engineering organization.
Another consequence of this external focus is that it consumes the majority of
resources in Engineering, leaving none for internal needs such as documentation or
product improvement. This is perceived to be the reason behind the high level of
continuation engineering, which takes resources away from new product development,
and causes much frustration because it is interpreted as leaving the job unfinished or
improperly done. It may be possible to accommodate some of the internal needs through
more resources, but it appears that continuation engineering is an integral part of how
products are developed at SIC.
The blurring of functions makes the development of explicit rules difficult. A
positive consequence of this is that each product undergoes a custom development model;
in other words, the same formula is not applied to all the problems and the combination
of functions that are performed is based on the engineer's interpretation of the project
needs. Even simple tasks, which could be routinized for efficiency, sometimes require
rethinking. This creates inefficiencies and delays. It also causes confusion among
engineers who are operating under different interpretations of the project and therefore on
the nature of reasonable expectations.
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The founder-owner has an extensive tacit knowledge of the product and the
market. His history with the company provides him with a unique perspective. He is
therefore an important asset to the company. His distinct experiences and skills,
combined with reliance on the interpretive process in product development, sometimes
causes others to misinterpret what he says or misunderstand his interpretation of what is
going on. This causes confusion, misunderstandings, and frustrations among those who
are involved in product development. A better definition of his role in product
development and communication of his vision with engineers might reduce this problem.
hi contrast to machine development, consumables have a separate proof of
concept/research and development pattern. The proof of concept/research is done in the
Industrial Design group, while the development is performed in Manufacturing.
Individuals involved in research make recommendation to those involved in the
development group. The consumables also go through the process of getting feedback
from customers and incorporating this feedback in the design during research. The
development phase produces a manufacturing model and refines the process of
manufacturing.
So, one of the main differences between the machine and consumable
development is that the proof of concept/research and development phases are not
intertwined for consumables as they are for machines. Another difference is the
development of consumables is more of a manufacturing process, whereas the

development of machines is an engineering process. The issues encountered in machine
development are not encountered in the development of consumables.

Overall, the transformation of ideas into products at SIC is considered successful
and has allowed the company to grow. Beyond the challenges and needs discussed
above, the manner in which this transformation occurs is not something that is taught in
engineering schools, in the undergraduate or graduate programs. Much like the literature
on PDPs, the process of learning how to apply engineering knowledge is theoretical,
generalized, and prescriptive. A systematic approach is generally encouraged and
considered appropriate. Most engineers become trained as product development
engineers with a specific technical focus. They are trained to apply their technical skills
within the constraints of a specific set of procedures in the environment they work in. An
interpretive approach requires something more than this; it requires that the engineer
explores and negotiates the environment within which his technical skills can be applied.
To refer back to Latour's black box, engineering schools teach the engineering product
development process as a black box. Besides technical skills, what engineers need to
learn is what takes place inside the black box and the skills needed to effectively cope
with life on the inside to get their jobs done.
The systematic approach to engineering development is an approach that assumes
low levels of ambiguity and high levels of definition. At the development stage, the
assumption is that much of the product has already been defined and the unknowns are
minimized; what is left is implementation. At companies such as SIC, project definitions
are generally fluid. The external focus of the company brings the ambiguities of the
outside world into the inside world of Engineering. The merging of functions spreads
these ambiguities throughout the entire product development. Dealing with a high level
of ambiguity is therefore a necessary part of an engineer's job at companies like SIC. If
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these ambiguities are not resolved at the organizational level, engineers will be expected
to resolve them at the level of individual projects.
Furthermore, a systematic approach leads to the expectation that projects have a
beginning with a clear problem definition and the engineer implements a solution,
verifies it, and with some modifications, the project comes to an end. The engineer is
rewarded or gets a sense of satisfaction on a job well done. The approach at SIC is much
more exploratory and incremental, where the beginning is not so clear and neither is the
ending. With continuation engineering as one of the functions performed in Engineering,
it almost appears as if projects never end. There are also frequent sudden changes of
direction. This aspect of product development leaves engineers very dissatisfied, for they
are not able to see the results of their work; they feel "yanked around." This lowers
morale and causes conflict. Engineering is exploratory and sometimes incremental work,
where the participating engineer learns and grows regardless of the outcome.
The new skills and expertise need to be recognized and rewarded as they are
passed along to the next project. The engineer should be made aware that he can perform
product development better as a result of what he has learned and how he has grown
within the organization. As Bovy and Vinck tell us (2003:74), "The identity of the
designer does not remain unchanged at the end of the design process. The designer
progressively discovers more about society as he is in the process of transforming it and
is thereby led to modify his actions and their results. The designer's identity is therefore
affected."
This systematic approach also makes engineering product development appear
rational and sanitized. Transformation of ideas into products is not just a technical
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process, but also a highly social one. Technical knowledge is applied and technical
decisions are made and debated within a social context. There are also emotions
involved in product development; these can be pride for a job well done, jealousy, fear of
losing one's job, anger for feeling ignored, indignation at perceiving that one's opinion is
not respected, and so on. Recognizing the social and emotional aspects of product
development would allow better social interactions and possibly lead to different types of
technical decisions and solutions.
A systematic approach can also lead to a focus on the process needs as opposed to
a focus on customers needs. This means that how things are done becomes more
important than what is done. This could also imply a focus on internal needs as opposed
to external needs. A focus on process can take the customer out of the picture for a
period of time. In a fast changing market or an evolving market, this could be
detrimental. A focus on customer needs creates a product that meets the customers'
short-term needs as well as provides clues for their long-term needs. Although it seems
that a balance between internal and external needs may be difficult to maintain at a
company like SIC, it is possible that a degree of internal needs can be satisfied if they can
be incorporated into a process that is not linear or sequential, but incremental and
feedback-based.
Although most engineers work on a broad range of problems, there is often
specific technical knowledge for which an engineer is hired and a specific set of functions

within Engineering that he is expected to perform. At companies such as SIC, it appears
that a much broader range of skills, outside of those learned in engineering schools,
allows the engineers to stretch over the various functions that are needed to get a job done
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within Engineering. For instance, the engineer working on Model-Q, who had a degree
in aerospace engineering, had taken a course in welding and was welding the prototype
for Model-Q in the machine shop. So, engineering knowledge, augmented with other
types of skills and knowledge in different functional areas, and an attitude that allows this
type of undertaking, is necessary for working in organizations such as SIC.
Most engineering schools also tout the ability to teach innovation. Consider, for
example, the San Jose State University vision and mission page of the Engineering school
website. Under Innovative Applications, it reads, "In addition to learning engineering
theory and skills, our students must have opportunities to learn innovation—a capability
highly valued in today's global economy. Given its close ties to Silicon Valley industry,
the College is in a unique position to focus its efforts on developing innovative
applications of technologies. Innovation, defined as the development and exercise of
creative processes to "see" beyond limits and boundaries, has the entrepreneurial quality
of understanding and meeting customers' needs. It often occurs across disciplinary
boundaries with contributing members having various functional expertises. Further, the
ability to innovate contributes directly to the success of enterprises" (SJSU 2007).
At companies such as SIC, there are no explicit rules for product development in
Engineering. In the absence of rules, people rely on the interpretive process to decide
what their next step should be. Individual characteristics, history, and the social
processes by which they interact lead to different interpretations. It is possible that it is
the interpretive process that allows contributions from a diverse set of people in
constructing a PDP, technically and procedurally, which contributes to the innovative
nature of products that are developed at SIC. If this were the case, then the interpretive
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system in determining a PDP, as opposed to a rule-based system, generally taught in
engineering schools, would be more conducive to innovative product development.
Learning to negotiate could also help develop engineers who would more comfortably
work in such an environment.
Engineering managers and engineers in organizations such as SIC have to be able
to perform and develop products through this interpretive process. Engineering schools
could better prepare them for this environment by moving away from a systematic
(black-box) approach in favor of an interpretive approach and by teaching that the
product development process is the integrated application of technical skills and social
skills.
In conclusion, there are challenges in organizations where the product
development process is interpretive, engineering functions are merged, resources are
limited, and engineering is a combination of different functional groups. However, these
challenges can be overcome if a model that supports an interpretive approach, rather than
the idealized model, is used to organize and manage Engineering, and to perform product
development. In the area of engineering education, the focus should be turned towards an
interpretive model, as opposed to the prescriptive and rule based model. A broad range
of technical and negotiation skills are needed to perform product development effectively
in such an environment. Given the increasingly important role of small, innovative
companies in creating economic growth, the issues addressed here will likely be of
continued importance. In particular, the type of development process described in this
thesis and its capacity to meet the changing demands of niche markets may be both a
strength of smaller companies, as well as a challenge to their organizational structure and
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processes. The implications for the skills of the engineers within them and for
engineering education are significant.
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APPENDIX A: GRAND TOUR
Functional layout
The general functional layout of the organization is shown in Figure 14. All the
functional groups are located on the first floor, with the exception of the industrial design
group and the owner/president's office, which are on the second floor.
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The lobby and the surrounding areas
Figure 15 provides a detail drawing of the lobby entrance and areas connected to
the lobby. As you enter the lobby, you see the receptionist on the right, the visitor's area
on the left, and the stairway that takes you to the second floor ahead. On the reception
table there is a sign-in book for visitors. The receptionist gives each visitor, who signs in,
a visitor's badge and notifies the person whom the visitor has come to see. Visitors are
not allowed to go in unaccompanied. On the left of the entrance, there is one sofa, two
seats and a coffee table with copies of METROPOLIS on it. Some of the products that
are made with SIC machines and consumables are exhibited in a display unit, near the
sitting area, presumably so that visitors will see them. Immediately past this point, you
can see the stairs that take you up to the second floor. On both sides of the stairs there is
a display of SIC products that show the evolution of SIC machines from the time that the
founder-owner was a 13-year old teenager, until now. It tells the history of SIC, from the
beginning until now. The display is in temporal order. On the left side of the stairs, the
first object is an old machine that the founder-owner found in his parent's basement.
This was apparently what got him interested in this business. This is followed by some
of the experiments and prototypes that he built of the first SIC machine. Above these,
along the wall, are a number of patents that SIC holds. There are also photos of people
working on these first machines at SIC back then. The founder-owner and one of the
engineers, Peter, are in one of the photos. They look to be in their twenties.
As you move to the right side of the stairs the current products are displayed.
You see a big change. The current products don't look like prototypes, but completed

and professional looking machines. The name of the company, which one sees on the
front door of the building and on the machines, is also the name of the founder-owner.
Just past the receptionist, on the right, is a hallway. On the right side of the
hallway are the windowed offices of the executives, including the CEO. This is the
power corridor. The Engineering and the Operations executives do not have offices here.
There is a small conference room on the left side of the hallway. The hallway ends in a
wide-open space, with a high ceiling, which is populated with a number of desks
occupied by the sales and marketing personnel. This area feels open and airy.
In the lobby area, immediately to the left of the sofa and chairs, there are two
doors. The left most door opens into a large room. One of the walls of this room is
dedicated to the photos of all the people who work at SIC. The person who occupies this
room is a customer support person who works with consumables. The right-most door in
the lobby opens into the large conference room where most of the meetings are held.
There is a hallway below the stairs. Across the hallway is the technical support
group. Going to the right takes you to the engineering test/design verification test area,
while going to the left takes you to the Engineering and Manufacturing areas.
The engineering test/design verification test area is a large area. There are many
lab benches, each of which has various machines or consumables that are being tested
and characterized. The test technicians, who report to the manager of engineering
test/design verification test, work in this area. The manager's workspace is in the
Engineering area. You can see machines and consumables that are being tested, either by
technicians or running on their own with some test firmware, any time you enter this lab.
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Figure 15 - Lobby and Surrounding Areas
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The technical support group occupies two rooms. One of these rooms is a
laboratory where repairs of the equipment take place. It has two large tables in the
middle and shelves on the sides that hold various test equipment and parts. The other is
an office shared by the supervisor of technical support and two technicians. This room
has three desks, with a phone and a computer per desk. The supervisor and his
technicians talk to customers by phone and sometimes visit customer sites. Products are
shipped to this group for repairs or replacement. There are returned equipment or
consumables usually lying around in this room.
The second floor
The stairs take you to the second floor, which is occupied by the founder-owner
and the industrial design group. See Figure 16. This is the power floor. The founderowner's office is on the left and the Industrial Design group area is on the right. The
founder-owner's office and his lab are connected. The first room one enters is his office,
which leads into the second room, his laboratory. The laboratory has tables in the middle
and shelves with storage containers along the walls. This is a place where he can make
prototypes of his ideas. His office has a desk, a table with two chairs and a visitor's seat.
The partition at the front of the office provides some privacy. There is a shelf at the back
of the office, behind his chair. It carries what look to be souvenirs and his child's
drawings. From where he sits, he can see and be seen through the window at the front of
his office. Standing in the lobby, one can see if he is sitting at his desk and he can see

who comes in.
On the right side of the second floor is the Industrial Design area. This is the
most colorful area in the whole of SIC. There is a nook behind the founder-owner's
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office that is used as the prototyping area by the designers and by the founder-owner.
When I visited this area, there was a prototype for a consumable and a machine for
making the consumable that was being tested. The actual Industrial Design area has three
people. One of them is Anne, who works with a variety of materials to design
consumables for the sales people and prototypes of custom products requested by the
customer. Her area is located at the beginning of a large open space that is Industrial
Design. Shelves that hold colorful materials that she uses for making consumable
prototypes separate her space from others. The table in the middle of the shelves holds
the products that she makes. She also has the SIC machines needed to make these
consumables on the tables along the walls. The other two industrial designers, Steve and
Luke, have desks for their computers, but also many different workspaces where they
build their prototypes of materials and do experiments.
Back on the first floor, going left along the hallway below the stairs leads you to
Engineering and Manufacturing.
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Engineering
Figure 17 shows some of the details of the various things that can be seen as one
goes along this hallway. On the right there is an open area that is used by Engineering
for testing or prototype building. This area is an extension of the engineering laboratory.
This area ends with the door to the lunchroom.
On the left of the hallway, directly across from the door of the lunchroom is the
entrance to the place officially known as Engineering, occupied by twelve people who are
not all functionally part of Engineering. The Engineering people include the Vice
President of Engineering (VPE), two mechanical engineers, two electronics engineers,
one firmware engineer, one mechanical designer and two engineering technicians. It also
includes the manager of engineering test/design verification test, a manufacturing
engineer, and a document control person. The area is open, large, and quiet, with only a
few partitions. Each person occupies a laboratory and office combination type of
workspace. Each workspace is personalized with a couple of desks or tables,
bookshelves, and photographs. There are equipment, parts, tools and/or drawings related
to what each person is working on. On the bookshelves there are data books that contain
the specifications of the parts that they are using, textbooks, specifications, binders that
hold patents, or even parts. Some of the workspaces have what look to be items related
to one project. This may include the machine, consumables, or parts. Others areas
appear to have layers of different papers, drawings, specifications, and other
documentation related to a number of different projects. This may be because the
engineer is working on these all in parallel. The VPE sits in his space located in the
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middle of Engineering. The engineering lab, which is part of this space, is walled off and
shared by all the engineers. People either work in their own workspace or in the lab.
People work on their own computers or on the machines that they are designing,
testing, or debugging. The only woman in this area is the manager of engineering
test/design verification test. The rest are all males.
The second entrance to Engineering leads to Purchasing and Manufacturing
offices. The Purchasing offices are three cubicles in a row. The Manufacturing
personnel sit in cubes that are located in a walled off space in front of another large
conference room, which the Vice President of Operations seems to use as his private
office.
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Machine assembly and lunch room
The lunchroom, shown in Figure 18 is a large L-shaped area. One section is
actually used as a lunchroom. It has a counter with a sink, a microwave, and a
refrigerator. There are a couple of coin operated dispensing machines for candy and
drinks. A number of tables are set in the middle of this area. One sees different people
have lunch here together. This includes the assembly line workers and supervisors, sales
and marketing people, engineers, industrial designers, executives, and the founder-owner.
This is the one area that people sit together, but don't necessarily speak to each other.
The other area of this lunchroom is a flexible expansion area for a variety of things, such
as temporary storage space, test area, ping-pong playing area and so on.
Past the lunchroom, along the hallway, is the beginning of the Manufacturing
area. The first Manufacturing area is the assembly area for the machines. This area is
literally the continuation of the hallway that leads to the lunchroom on one side and
Engineering on the other. The assembly area is also an open space that is walled off by
shelves that carry parts for the various machines that are being assembled. The middle of
the walled off space is a number of rows of tables that have rollers on them, which allow
assembly workers to roll partly assembled machines from one workstation to another.
Different areas are used for different machines that are being assembled. The end of the
assembly line is where the products are tested post assembly and then packaged.
Across from this machine assembly area is the machine shop, which contains a
variety of machining equipment. The machinist is the person who is officially in charge
of this area, although others, such as mechanical engineers and the manufacturing
engineer also use this shop.
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This section of the building ends with a wall that opens into another much larger
assembly area for the consumables, where prototypes of the consumables are built for
testing and manufactured for shipping. There are a number of large machines that are
used for these tasks and a number of different technicians that operate these machines.
There are piles of materials sitting on the floor, which are fed into these machines. There
is also a lot of noise when the machines are operating. This whole area has the look and
feel of a real factory, where raw materials go into the machines and products come out.
At the far end of the building is the shipping/receiving section. There are large
door at the loading docks, where trucks pull in and out and load or unload their goods.
This is where raw materials flow in and products flow out of SIC.
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Figure 18 - Machine Assembly Area and Lunchroom

